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The Proposed Ohio Rules of
Evidence: The Case Against
Richard S. Walinski*
Howard Abramoff* *
In 1977 the Ohio General Assembly rejected a proposed set of evidence
rules based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio
has resubmitted the rules for legislative consideration in 1978. The authors,
as members of the Attorney General's staff, explain their objections to the
proposed Rules, focusing on problems of draftsmanship, changes from pre-
sent Ohio common law, and the unprecedented discretion granted to trial
judges. They emphasize that these problems will create confusion and
uncertainty, results which are contrary to the avowed purposes of codifying
the rules of evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY
T HE FINAL DRAFT' of the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence was
submitted in January, 1977, to the General Assembly by the Su-
preme Court of Ohio under the authority of the Modem Courts Amend-
ment of the Ohio Constitution, article IV, section 5.2 The proposed
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1. The proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence were initially published for public
comment on July 12, 1976. Draft Ohio Rules of Evidence, 49 OHIo B. 929-60 (1976). A
synopsis of comments noting consequent changes in Ohio law was studied by the
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee members, and further recommendations were
given to the Ohio Supreme Court suggesting modifications in the published draft. The
final product was published for review and public comment on February 21, 1977.
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 50 OHIo B. 231-57 (1977).
2. Ohio Constitution, article IV, § 5, in pertinent part provides:
(A)(1) In addition to all other powers vested by this article in the supreme
court, the supreme court shall have general superintendence over all courts in
the state. Such general superintending power shall be exercised by the chief
justice in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court.
(B) The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and proce-
dure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than
the fifteenth day of January. . . and amendments to any such proposed rules
may be so filed not later than the first day of May in that session. Such rules
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Rules were the eighth set3 of procedural rules prescribed by the
supreme court since 1968 when the Modern Courts Amendment gave
rulemaking authority to the supreme court. Had the proposed Rules of
Evidence not been rejected by the legislature, they would have taken
effect on July 1, 1977.
The Ohio rules are patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence
which went into effect on July 1, 1975. 4 The development of the
Federal Rules began in 1961 when Chief Justice Earl Warren
appointed a special committee which later concluded that uniform
evidence rules were both feasible and advisable. 5 A second committee
was designated in 1965 to recommend to the Court a set of such rules
for federal courts. Between 1965 and 1972 the advisory committee
produced two drafts and a final set of proposed Rules.
6
The Supreme Court's proposed Rules were transmitted to Congress
on February 5, 1973, principally under the ostensible authority of 28
U.S.C. § 20727 which empowers the Supreme Court of the United
shall take effect on the following first day of July, unless prior to such day the
general assembly adopts a concurrent resolution of disapproval. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.
3. The Ohio Supreme Court has proposed five sets of procedural rules (as opposed
to rules of practice) pursuant to article IV, § 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution: (1) Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure; (3) Ohio Rules of
Juvenile Procedure; (4) Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (5) Rules of the Court of
Claims.
Two sets of rules have been proposed pursuant to § 5(A): (1) Rules of Superintend-
ence for Municipal Courts, and (2) Rules of Superintendence for County Courts.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-585, 88 Stat. 1926. For a detailed history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence prior to their effective date, see C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5006 (1977); 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 10-40
(1976).
5. See Green, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of
Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D.
73, 114 (1962).
6. In 1969 the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence submitted its prelimi-
nary draft to the Standing Committee, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States. Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D.
161 (1969). This draft was circulated to elicit comments from the bench and bar. A
revised draft was then submitted to the Standing Committee. See Letter from Judge
Albert B. Marls, quoted in 51 F.R.D. 316 (1971). This draft was approved by the Judicial
Conference in October, 1970 and submitted to the Supreme Court, which returned the
draft to the Committee for further comments. In March, 1971 the draft was printed and
widely circulated. A final draft was approved by the Judicial Conference and submitted
to the Supreme Court in October, 1971. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), in pertinent part provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
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States to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the various
federal courts. Congress, however, rejected the Supreme Court's pro-
posed Rules of Evidence, on the basis that the Court, in proposing
rules of evidence, had exceeded its power to promulgate rules of
"practice and procedure.' '8 In order to clarify its view of the Supreme
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil ac-
tions . ..
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by
the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not
later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they
have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the
contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such
rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
The Suprem6 Court also cited as authority 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (1970) (criminal procedure
and appeal), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (procedure before verdict), 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1970)
(procedure after verdict), and 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970) (bankruptcy).
By order dated November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas dissenting,
approved the Advisory Committee's October, 1971 draft in toto and promulgated the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Justice Douglas' primary objections were: (1) he doubted
whether rules of evidence are within the purview of the statute under which the Court
had authority to submit rules; (2) he was concerned that the Court did not write the Rules
and was only a conduit for their promulgation; and (3) he believed that the development
of the law of evidence is best left to a "case-by-case development by the courts or by
Congress." 409 U.S. 1132 (1972).
8. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973). The Act was captioned: "An Act to
promote the separation of constitutional powers..... "reflecting Congress' judgment
that rules of evidence were not the proper subject of the Supreme Court's rulemaking
power. The Act insured that Congress had a full opportunity to review and study the
Rules, S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS. 2215.
Substantial criticism has been leveled at the wisdom of courts exercising broad
rulemaking power, especially in the area of evidence. See Justice Douglas' dissent to the
transmittal of the Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress, 409 U.S. 1132 (1972). Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has broad powers under the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (see note 7 supra), commentators have also questioned
its competency to issue rules of evidence. Professor Wickes believed that because the
Supreme Court had failed since 1792 to prescribe any uniform rules of evidence, to
undertake such a "revolutionary departure from the customary practice of courts. . . in
the absence of clear and specific authority" appeared unwarranted. Wickes, The New
Rule Making Powers of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEx. L. REV. 1, 25 (1934).
Others who have studied this question have concluded that the Rules Enabling Act did
not include the authority to propose evidentiary rules. E.g., Goldberg, The Supreme
Court, Congress and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667 (1975). See generally
Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory Committee, Events Leading to Proposal for Uniform
Rules, 22 A.B.A.J. 780, 782-83 (1936). But see Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 641-44 (1935); Moore &
Bendix, Congress, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1974).
When Congress eventually adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence by statute, it
[Vol. 28:344
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Court's authority, or lack of it, in this area, Congress also legislated
that ruies of evidence could not become effective in the federal court
system until "expressly approved by Act of Congress." 9 The Federal
Rules of Evidence eventually became law by Act of Congress, effec-
tive July 1, 1975.10
The proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence were drafted by a panel
appointed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1975,11 charged with the
single mission of fashioning rules for Ohio's courts based upon the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 12 The committee was not asked to consider
the wisdom of codified rules, nor was it required to study other forms
of codification, such as those that exist in Maryland,13 New Jersey 14 or
California. 15
The committee performed its narrow duty, 16 drafted rules, and
reported them to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The court approved
them, 17 and under the apparent authority of the Modem Courts
Amendment,' 8 sent the Rules to the General Assembly.
19
reiterated its judgment that rules of evidence were not the proper subject of the Supreme
Court's rulemaking power. In § 2 of Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1948 (1975), Congress
established a procedure for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence which substantially
differs from the procedure for amending rules of "practice and procedure." Compare 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), with 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. V 1975). The new procedure
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2076 gives either House of Congress veto power over newly
proposed rules of evidence. Rules regarding privilege may become effective only if
specifically approved by Congress.
The Ohio General Assembly has also drawn the inference that Congress disapproved
the proposed Federal Rules because they were not the proper subject of the Supreme
Court's rulemaking power. House Concurrent Resolution 14 cited the following as one of
the considerations for rejecting the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence in 1977:
The Congress of the United States has already considered the subject of
codification of the law of evidence and determined that such codification is the
proper function of the legislative rather than the judicial branch of government,
as evidenced by its act of March 30, 1973 (Public Law 93-12, 87 Stat. I [sic])
which deferred the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court until such time as they were enacted into
law by statute.
See Appendix A at 2.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
10. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
I1. O'Neill, Introduction, Symposium, The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L.
REV. 515 (1977).
12. Miller, The Game Plan: Drafting the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U. L. REV.
549, 553 (1977).
13. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. tit.10 (1974).
14. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, subtit. 9 (West 1976).
15. CAL. EvID. CODE § I (West 1968).
16. The committee's limited mission contrasts sharply with the broad task assigned
to the joint select committee. Am. Sen. J.R. 25, at 2. See Appendix B at 2.
17. December 2, 1976.
18. OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 5(B).
19. January 12, 1977.
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Ohio's Modern Courts Amendment requires the supreme court to
submit any proposed rules regarding practice and procedure to the
General Assembly for its consideration before such rules become
effective. 20 The Ohio General Assembly received the supreme court's
proposed Evidence Rules on January 12, 1977, and referred them to a
joint subcommittee composed of members of the judiciary committees
of both houses. 21 On April 20, 1977, the subcommittee unanimously
recommended to the judiciary committees of both houses that the
supreme court's proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence be rejected. 22 Ac-
20. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). In this respect Ohio is somewhat alone in its ap-
proach to the court's rulemaking power. For example, in no state that adopted a varia-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence did the state supreme court formally propose rules
pursuant to rulemaking power and submit them to the legislature for formal review.
Arizona adopted the rules of evidence by order of its supreme court pursuant to article 6,
§ 5 of the Arizona Constitution, which empowers the court to promulgate rules without
submission to the state legislature. Maine's adaptation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
was accomplished pursuant to specific authority granted to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court to promulgate rules of evidence without submission to the state legislature. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 8 (1964). Similarly in Minnesota, the supreme court exercised its
power to promulgate rules of evidence without submission to the state legislature. MINN.
STAT. § 480-0591 (West 1971). In Nebraska, the rules of evidence were enacted by the
legislature. NEB. REV..STAT. §§ 27-101 to 27-1103 (1975 Supp.). The rules became
effective in Nevada also by legislative action. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-55.010 (1975).
The rules of evidence in New Mexico were promulgated under authority granted by
statute to the supreme court. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-1 (Supp. 1975). The North Dakota
Rules of Evidence were adopted by supreme court order pursuant to authority granted
by the legislature. N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-02-11 (1974). In Wisconsin the supreme court
relied on statuory authority to promulgate rules of evidence. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 251.18
(West 1971). The Michigan Supreme Court proposed rules based on the federal model,
effective as of January 5, 1978. 399 Mich. 951 (1976-77). Vyoming has also recently
adopted a similar set of rules under the authority of Wyoming Statutes § 5-18 (1977).
The closest resemblance to Ohio's procedure is found in the federal system where, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), the Supreme Court of the United States
proposed rules of evidence to Congress only to have Congress reject them as not the
proper subject matter of court rules. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
21. The Joint Subcommittee of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the
proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence was comprised of Senators Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr.
(D.-Cleveland), Michael Schwarzwalder (D.-Columbus), Stanley J. Aronoff (R.-Cin-
cinnati), and Representatives Paul Leonard (D.-Dayton), Terry Tranter (D.-Cincinnati)
and William Batchelder (R.-Medina). Donald L. Robertson, an attorney with the Legis-
lative Service Commission, served as staff attorney to the subcommittee. David K.
Frank, counsel to the subcommittee's House minority membership, took an active
interest in the subcommittee's and House's consideration of the proposed Rules as a
result of his disagreement with the concept of expanded trial court discretion.
Participation by the bench and bar during the subcommittee hearings was minimal.
During the three weeks of subcommittee hearings, the only persons to testify before the
subcommittee were members of the Ohio Supreme Court's Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee, testifying in favor of the proposed Rules, and a representative of Attorney
General William J. Brown opposing adoption of the Rules.
22. See Appendix C at 1.
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cepting the subcommittee's recommendation, the House Judiciary
Committee23 prepared House Concurrent Resolution 14 and unani-
mously recommended to the House of Representatives that the resolu-
tion be adopted.24 Both houses unanimously adopted the resolution. 25
H. REASONS FOR THE REJECTION
Ohio was the first state to reject, at least temporarily, evidence
rules patterned on the Federal Rules.26 The report27 prepared by the
joint subcommittee cited several reasons for its recommendation of
rejection.28 First, the legislature felt it did not have enough time in the
five and one-half months between submission of the rules and the
July 1, 197729 effective date to make a reasoned and careful study of
the effect the Rules would have on the current law of Ohio.
Second, no exhaustive study had been made by the General As-
sembly to determine whether adoption of the Federal Rules is feasible
23. The committee was chaired by Harry J. Lehman (D.-Cleveland).
24. See Appendix A at 1.
25. On June 15, 1977, the House of Representatives adopted the resolution 91-0.
OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 1054-55, 112th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1977).
On June 27, 1977, the Senate followed suit, 31-0. OHIO SENATE JOURNAL 674-75, 112th
Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1977). On September 29, 1977, the General Assembly adopted Am.
Sen. Joint Resolution No. 25. OHIo SENATE JOURNAL 1123-26, 112th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess.
(1977). This resolution created a joint select committee to study the proposed Ohio Rules
of Evidence and to report back to the legislature by December 31, 1978. See Appendix B
at 2.
On January 12, 1978, the Ohio Supreme Court resubmitted the proposed Ohio Rules
of Evidence to the General Assembly. The Rules recently proposed are identical to those
rejected in 1977. Again in 1978, the Rules were transmitted without advisory committee
notes or commentary.
The fact that the court chose to resubmit the proposed Rules in 1978 threatens to
create an unseemly conflict between the court and the legislature. The General Assembly
by Joint Resolution 25 established a special subcommittee to study comprehensively the
law of evidence in its statutory, rule, and commission law forms. The resolution set a
deadline of December 31, 1978 for the special subcommittee's report. By submitting the
proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence under authority of the Modem Courts Amendment,
however, the court forces the legislature to act on the proposed Rules by June 31, 1978,
six months short of the time the legislature considered appropriate for the subcommit-
tee's review of the entire question of evidence reform.
26. The Florida legislature also has delayed the effective date of the Florida Rules of
Evidence pending further study of the effect adoption of the Rules would have on the
state bar and on the administration of justice in the Florida courts. 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 189 (West).
27. See Appendix C.
28. While the reasons cited in this section for the subcommittee's recommendation
of rejection are those given by the subcommittee itself, the order in which they are
discussed is not the order given in the subcommittee's report. Moreover, the authors
have, for purposes of clarification, elaborated on some of the reasons expressed by the
subcommittee. Compare text with Appendix C.
29. The effective date is established in Ohio Constitution, article IV, § 5(B).
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in Ohio or whether the Rules would fit the specific needs of Ohio's
courts. 30 The committee noted that after the initial promulgation of the
Federal Rules by the Supreme Court of the United States, Congress
devoted considerable time to a review of the Rules before enacting
them into law.31 The legislature considered it no less its responsibility
to consider carefully the operation and effect of the proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence.
Third, the committee was troubled by the fact that the supreme
court submitted the rules to the legislature with no explanatory mate-
rial. The court sent nothing more than the text of the proposed Rules.
By comparison, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
modified for use in Ohio, the Advisory Committee Staff that had
worked on the proposed Ohio civil rules published its commentary on
the anticipated operation and effect of the new rules. 32 It has been
expected that a similar commentary will be published by the Supreme
Court's Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, but at the time this
article was submitted for publication, the legislature had not yet been
given a complete version of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee's
analysis.
The subcommittee noted in its report that the proposed Ohio Rules
of Evidence contain such "broad, general principles" 3 3 that even
lawyers who had studied the rules could not agree on a common
interpretation of them. The supreme court's Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee's research and analysis would have been helpful to the
legislature in ascertaining the extent to which Ohio's current law of
evidence would be affected by the various evidentiary innovations
contained in the proposed Rules as well as in ascertaining the wisdom
of such changes. With no opportunity to study the Advisory Commit-
tee's commentary, and with little time available, the legislature was
left to imagine on its own the operation and ultimate effect of the
proposed Rules.
Moreover, the legislature is obligated under article IV, section 5 of
30. The subcommittee noted for example that the federal courts do not have pro-
bate, domestic, bastardy, or juvenile justice matters to litigate. Cf. REPORT OF THE JOINT
SUBCOMM. TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. ON THE PROPOSED OHIO RULES
OF EVIDENCE, 112th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. 4 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as JOINT
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT] (federal courts do not handle domestic relations, or paternity
cases, traffic violations, or forcible entry or detainer cases). See Appendix C, at 4.
31. The Federal Rules of Evidence were first submitted by the Supreme Court on
February 5, 1973, but did not become law until January 2, 1975.
32. See OHIO REV..CODE ANN., Civil Rules (Page 1971). See also Harper, Introduc-
tion, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure: A Symposium, 39 CIN. L. REV. 465, 469-70 (1970).
33. JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 30, at I; see Appendix C at 1.
350 [Vol. 28:344
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the Ohio Constitution to pass upon procedural rules proposed by the
supreme court. Without the assistance of the supreme court's Evidence
Rules Advisory Committee's comments, the legislature's ability to
perform its constitutional obligation was severely impaired. The legis-
lature found itself in the unenviable position of being asked to give its
final approval to the Rules while facing the distressing possibility that
the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee would subsequently publish
its official notes containing histories or explanations that, if known
beforehand, might have influenced the legislature to disapprove the
rules. The Office of the Attorney General argued to the subcommittee
that it was untimely for the legislature to take the irrevocable step of
approving the proposed Rules without having in final form the Evi-
dence Rules Advisory Committee's official commentary.
Fourth, the committee could not, in the time alloted to it, deter-
mine the precise effects of the proposed Rules upon existing sections
of the Ohio Revised Code. Article IV, section 5, of the Ohio
Constitution provides that any laws in conflict with rules of practice
and procedure adopted by the supreme court are superseded. A pre-
liminary survey by the Legislative Service Commission concluded that
more than two thousand existing Ohio statutes might be affected by the
Rules as proposed. 34 The subcommittee believed that it must have a
clearer view of the conflicts between the Revised Code and the pro-
posed Ohio Rules of Evidence in order to make a measured determina-
tion as to whether it should recommend retaining a rule of evidence
established by the Revised Code or recommend the adoption of the rule
proposed by the supreme court. The subcommittee also believed that
the effect of the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence in a number of
instances, although proposed as procedural rules, would be to create or
change substantive rights. 35 The subcommittee believed that the legis-
34. Although the Ohio Supreme Court's Evidence Rules Advisory Committee was
aware of the large number of statutes potentially affected by adoption of the Rules, the
committee did not consider it its responsibility to determine which or how many statutes
would be affected by the Rules. Miller, supra note 12, at 553. Professor Miller stated
that:
Although some of the 2883 references were duplications, and additional refer-
ences used the key words in other than an evidentiary manner, it was indeed
frightening to contemplate the potential power and eventual impact of the final
rules of evidence. Third, who would determine what statutes would be repealed
when the rules became effective? (There was indeed great relief among the
Committee membership upon discovering that such an assignment was not a
part of its responsibilities.)
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
35. An example of a substantive right that could be changed by the proposed Rules is
the limited guarantee of privacy presently accorded to rape victims who offer testimony
against their attackers. Subsections 2907.02(D), (E), and (F) of the Ohio Revised Code
place limitations on evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity. This
19781
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lature was constitutionally obliged to make certain that "rules of
section conflicts with proposed Ohio Rules 102, 403, 404, 405 and 406. Under the
supremacy provision of the Modern Courts Amendment, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B),
the Rules would presumably prevail. Similarly, § 2743.43(A)(2) limits the use of expert
medical witnesses to those who devote at least 75% of their time to clinical practice or
teaching. Here, again, conflicting Rules 701-03 would seemingly prevail.
The question is not free from doubt because the Modern Courts Amendment pro-
vides that "rules governing practice and procedure ... shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right." The Rules will prevail over conflicting statutes only when
the court finds that substantive rights are not affected. The ironic result of this require-
ment is that instead of bringing certainty and uniformity to evidence law, questions about
the constitutional validity of many of the Rules will result because the line between
substance and procedure is far from clear.
The problem of drawing the substance-procedure dichotomy became particularly
acute in Ohio following the adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment in 1965. Ohio
courts have traditionally held that it is the legislature which has general powers to
prescribe rules of evidence subject only to constitutional limitations. Hammond v. State,
78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N.E. 416 (1908); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d
164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). See generally Comment, The Rule-Making Power of Ohio
Courts, I OHIO ST. L.J. 123 (1935). As the court noted in Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann,
54 Ohio St. 10, 42 N.E. 768 (1896):
There can be no doubt respecting the general power of a state to prescribe the
rules of evidence which shall be observed by its judicial tribunals. It is a matter
concerning its internal policy, over which its legislative department has authori-
ty, limited only by the constitutional guarantees respecting due process of law,
vested rights, and the inviolability of contracts.
Id. at 17, 42 N.E. at 769 (emphasis added).
It is not clear whether the passage of the Modern Courts Amendment was meant to
change the legislature's traditional authority in the evidence area. According to William
W. Milligan and James Pohlman, who served as Co-Chairman and Secretary of the
Modern Courts Committee: "There should now be no doubt that the authority of the
Supreme Court in the rule-making area is plenary. Court action in this area supersedes
contradictory legislation. The legislature retains a veto over such court made rules, but
no longer has the primary responsibility." Milligan & Pohlman, The 1968Modern Courts
Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 829 (1968). Milligan and
Pohlman noted, however, that: "There will always be cases on the borderline of sub-
stance and procedure. Since the Supreme Court, in its judicial capacity, will have the
ultimate authority to determine the boundary line between procedural and substantive
matters, it may be presumed that any rules promulgated by the supreme court will fall
within the procedural rather than the subsantive area. An example of the borderline area
is the rules of evidence. In certain states, rules of evidence are considered to be
procedural, in other states substantive." Milligan & Pohlman, supra at 832. But see
deleted language of H. Con. Res. 14, note 45 infra.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has on several occasions examined the interplay between
court-made rules and substantive rights. In some cases it appears that the courts
did not look on legislative approval as an evaluation of whether the rules had substantive
impact. See Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1976); State v. Hughes,
41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975); Krause, Adm'r v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132,
285 N.E.2d 736, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
In Krause, it was argued that the adoption of Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
constituted a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity. The Ohio Constitution, article I,
§ 16, provides that suits may be brought against the state in such manner as provided by
law and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure supposedly presented the requisite "man-
ner." The court held that the rulemaking authority of the supreme court is limited to the
[Vol. 28:344
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evidence adopted as rules of court should clearly relate solely to
formulation of rules governing practice and procedure, and by such rules the court may
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. Thus, because sovereign immunity
is a substantive right of the State of Ohio such a change in public policy could only be
waived by legislative action. Id. at 145, 285 N.E.2d at 744. The court recognized the
difficulty inherent in assessing whether nominally procedural rules could affect substan-
tive rights. In discussing the distinction between substance and procedure the court
defined substantive law as that body of law which creates, defines, and regulates the
rights of the parties in contrast to procedure which pertains to the method of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress. Id.
In assessing the validity of its own rules, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not hesitated
to invalidate rules because they were found to "abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive
right." In State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 210, 324 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1975), the
supreme court invalidated Appellate Rule 4(B) because it conflicted with a substantively
created right of appellate courts to exercise their discretion in determining when to allow
the prosecution to appeal in certain criminal cases. In Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83,
346 N.E.2d 286 (1976), the court considered the conflict between Civil Rule 75(P) and
§ 3109.04 of the Ohio Revised Code over the standard for determining custody of minor
children. The supreme court held that insofar as Civil Rule 75(P) abridges
§ 3901.04, the rule is invalid under § 5(B) of article IV of the Ohio Constitution. The court
recognized that where conflicts arise between the civil rules and the statutory law, the
rule will control on matters of procedure and the statute will control on matters of
substantive law. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 346 N.E.2d at 288 (relying on State v. Hughes, 41
Ohio St. 2d at 210, 324 N.E.2d at 733 (1975); Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St. 86, 88,290
N.E.2d 841, 844 (1972); Krause, Adm'r v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d at 145, 285 N.E.2d 744.
These cases present but one side of the analysis. On the other side, a pre-existing
statute that relates to procedure and is inconsistent with a court rule will be held invalid.
Several lower courts have recently held pleading requirements in the new Ohio court of
claims and medical malpractice statutes to be unconstitutional as being inconsistent with
the civil rules. E.g., Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, 51 Ohio App. 2d 44 (1976) (Court of'
Claims Rule 4(B) pertaining to the time for filing a removal petition takes precedence
over time limitations in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(E)(1) (Page 1977)); Graley v.
Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. 1976) (pleading requirements of
Medical Malpractice Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Page 1977) violate article IV,
§ 5(B) of Ohio Constitution); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976) (pleading requirements of Medical Malpractice Act conflict
with pleading provisions of the civil rules).
In promulgating the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence under its rulemaking authority
the Supreme Court of Ohio has placed itself in an untenable position. If the-court takes
the position that rules of evidence do in many instances "abridge, enlarge, or modify"
substantive rights, then the court must, on a case-by-case basis, selectively engage in
holding specific rules invalid as against specific statutes or other substantive rights. On
the other hand, if the court finds the evidence rules affect only procedural rights, it will
automatically invalidate legislative efforts that attracted public attention and which
represented a considered policy decision. In all of these cases, the court would face not
only the normal issues of statutory construction that any newly promulgated codification
of rules raises, but it would have to address substantial constitutional questions in almost
every case presenting evidentiary issues. Litigants would contest not only the applicabil-
ity of the rules in the courtroom but also their constitutional validity. (In addition, the
court may be faced with conflicting constitutional provisions. Section 39 of article II of
the Ohio Constitution specifically delegates to the state legislature the power to formu-
late rules relating to expert testimony in criminal trials and proceedings.)
At a minimum, it may be said that if the proposed Rules become effective, many of
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practice and procedure, and not to substance. "36
Another reason expressed by the subcommittee for delaying adop-
tion of the rules of evidence related to the histories of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ohio
adopted a variation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970. By
then, the civil rules had been in operation in the federal courts for over
thirty-two years. 3 In addition to the hundreds of cases interpreting the
various rules there were more than 140 amendments, additions, and
deletions made to improve their operation.3 8 As a result, Ohio was able
to adopt civil rules in 1970 that were somewhat refined and of relative-
ly certain meaning. Similar development had occurred before Ohio
implemented a variation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1975. By the time of Ohio's adoption, the criminal rules had been in
effect for over twenty-nine years, 39 and more than 100 amendments,
additions, and deletions had improved their operation. 4° By compari-
son, when the legislature received the Evidence Rules, the Federal
Rules of Evidence had been in effect only since July 1, 1975, so there
the Rules of Evidence will be of uncertain validity until the supreme court passes on
whether they affect substantive rights. The present unsettled condition of state law
concerning what is procedural and what is substantive only enhances the uncertainty
created in the minds-of legislators, litigants, and lawyers waiting for the supreme court to
act. In this situation it is particularly appropriate for the legislative branch, before it
allows the Rules to become effective, to offer its own view of whether particular rules
affect substantive rights. (Since the supreme court's power is constitutional, any attempt
to legislate on evidentiary matters after the Rules become effective could provoke a
serious separation of powers conflict. For a discussion of judicial rulemaking and its
conflict with legitimate legislative prerogatives, see J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT
RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 77-104 (1977).)
36. JOINT SUBcOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 30, at 3; see Appendix C at 3.
Even if all the Ohio Rules of Evidence are ultimately found to be matters of
procedure by the supreme court, see note 35 supra, perhaps they ought not to be viewed
in the same light as, for example, the Rules of Civil Procedure. Evidence rules, perhaps
more than other rules that are clearly procedural in nature, reflect social judgments on
matters of broad public policy. See e.g, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D), (E), & (F)
(Page Supp. 1977), discussed in note 35 supra. Rather than focusing on the unanswerable
substance/procedure question, the legislature may simply choose not to give the supreme
court control over evidentiary matters that relate to sensitive areas of social concern.
37. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were transmitted to Congress by Attorney
General Homer S. Cummings on January 3, 1938, and became effective on September
16, 1938. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. at p. 7729 (1970).
38. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, has been amended
as many as five times. FED. R. Civ. P. 6, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1977). The scope and
methods of discovery also have been substantially changed.
39. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were transmitted to Congress by
Attorney General Francis Biddle on January 3, 1945, and became effective on March 21,
1946. FED. R. CRIM. P., 18 U.S.C. at p. 4479 (1970).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17, 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 17 (1975) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, 18
U.S.C.A. Rule 41 (Supp. 3 1977), for example, have each been revised five times.
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had been only slightly more than a year and a half of experience with
them. The Attorney General's Office argued before the subcommittee
that it would be imprudent to jettison Ohio's common law of evi-
dence41 in favor of a codification that would probably require at least
as much interpretation, adjustment, and refinement as the earlier pro-
cedural rules. Indeed, at the time the legislature was asked to act, the
Federal Rules of Evidence had been fleshed out by only sparse case
law.42 Finally, the subcommittee questioned whether the bench and bar
were prepared to operate under these Rules, and whether concerned
parties recognized that the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence are new
both in language and, what is more important, in judicial philosophy. 43
While the reasons cited above were those given by the subcommit-
tee for its recommendation that the Rules be rejected, the House of
Representatives and the Senate had additional reasons for rejecting the
41. Ohio Constitution, article IV, § 5(B) provides: "All laws in conflict with such
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." For a
discussion of the relationship between statutory enactments and court-made rules, see
note 35 supra.
42. Some of the provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence that were most innova-
tive and/or controversial had received very little discussion by the federal courts prior to
the time the Ohio General Assembly received the proposed Rules. For example, Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5), the so-called residual hearsay clauses, were highly controversial
throughout the drafting, promulgation, and congressional consideration of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Different methods of treating the hearsay rule and its exceptions
were proposed at every stage of consideration. The Supreme Court's Advisory Commit-
tee's proposal, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), the final draft submitted to
Congress, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971), the House version, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7079, and the Senate
version, S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7065-66, each adopted a different approach to the problem. The Congression-
al Conference Committee rejected them all and adopted yet another version. CONF. REP.
No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7106.
Yet, at the time the Supreme Court of Ohio transmitted the proposed Ohio Rules of
Evidence, only one federal appeals court had discussed the operation of the highly
controversial Rule 803(24). In Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, 519 F.2d 1178
(5th Cir. 1975), the court held that a Federal Aeronautics Administration advisory
circular on the standard of care for airplane landings, although hearsay, was admissible
under Rule 803(24). The circular was without the force or effect of law but was offered
as evidence of the "care customarily followed by pilots." Although the circular was
offered for a hearsay purpose and was not within any of the recognized exceptions, the
court found adequate "external circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required
by Rule 803(24) in the fact that it was "published by a government agency whose only
conceivable interest was in insuring safety." 519 F.2d at 1182. See also United States v.
Gomez, 529 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976).
Similarly, only one reported court of appeals case had dealt with Rule 804(b)(5) at
that time. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977). See text accompanying notes 125-31 infra.
43. JoiNT SUBCOMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 30, at 5; see Appendix C at 5.
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proposed Rules. For example, the resolution adopted by both houses
noted that the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence "create new areas of
broad, virtually unreviewable discretion and otherwise effectuate
numerous changes in the law of evidence currently recognized in this
state, which has for years served the interests of impartial justice and
has evolved from the experience of several centuries . ... "I
Moreover, the resolution in its final form45 observed that Congress has
concluded that "codification of the law of evidence . . . is the proper
function of the legislative rather than the judicial branch of govern-
ment. " 6
IH. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPPOSITION TO THE
PROPOSED OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Office of the Attorney General opposed adoption of the pro-
posed Ohio Rules of Evidence in any form. Several of the reasons
expressed in the report submitted by the joint subcommittee and in the
concurrent resolution had been urged by the Attorney General's Office
at various times during the legislative hearings. The Attorney Gener-
al's opposition, however, was focused on two principal grounds of
concern. First, close review of the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence
revealed poor draftsmanship and/or startling content in about twenty of
the proposed rules. 47 Some of the problems of content and draftsman-
44. H. Con. Res. 14; see Appendix A at 1.
45. The Concurrent Resolution in the form originally presented to the House
Judiciary Committee contained the following reason, among others, for rejecting the
supreme court's proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence:
It was not the General Assembly's intent in the adoption of the Modern
Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, and specifically, Section 5(B) of
Article IV of said Constitution, to grant The Ohio Supreme Court the authority
to promulgate rules codifying the law of evidence ...
By a vote of 8-7, the House Judiciary Committee deleted the quoted language. The
motion to delete was hotly debated. Representative William Batchelder (R.-Medina)
spoke at length for retention of the language arguing that it accurately reflected the intent
of the General Assembly that proposed the Modern Courts Amendment. Representative
Paul Leonard (D.-Dayton), chief sponsor of Concurrent Resolution 14 and whose
motion it was to delete the language, stated that he agreed with Representative Batchel-
der's argument about the legislature's understanding of the Modem Courts Amend-
ment's meaning. He urged deletion, however, because he considered the language
unnecessarily inflammatory in light of other adequate reasons to reject the proposed
Ohio Rules of Evidence.
46. H. Con. Res. 14; see Appendix A at 2.
47. This article does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of all of the
problems associated with each of the proposed Rules the authors find troublesome.
Some of the problems with proposed Rules 102, 402, 403, 407, 501, 608, 612, 613, 701,
702, 703, 705, 801, 803, and 804 are discussed in greater or lesser detail in this article. By
discussing these specific Rules, the authors intend to illustrate generally the kinds of
draftsmanship and content problems that also exist in other Rules such as proposed
Rules 103 (rulings on evidence); 106 (remainder of or related writings or recorded
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ship are inherited directly from the Federal Rules of Evidence while
others are peculiar to Ohio's version of the rules. Second, there was
fundamental concern over the unprecedented amounts of discretion
granted to trial judges. 48
A. Criticism of Specific Rules
Rule 612 illustrates a problem of draftsmanship that is Ohio's
unique contribution to the confusion generated by the Rules. The rule
addresses the question of counsel's access to writings used by witnes-
ses to refresh recollection either prior to or during testimony. 49 Current
Ohio law provides that if a witness uses a document to refresh his recollec-
tion while he is on the stand, opposing counsel is entitled to inspect that
document.50 If, however, a witness uses a document prior to taking the
stand, opposing counsel is not entitled to have access.51 The proposed
Rule seeks to give opposing counsel access to the document in the
latter situation if the trial court in its discretion so orders. The ambigui-
ty in the proposed Ohio Rule lies in this new grant of discretion. While
Federal Rule 612 makes it abundantly clear that the discretion exists
only with respect-to documents used before testifying,52 one cannot say
statements); 404 (character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 609 (impeachment
by conviction of crime); 611 (mode and order of interrogation and presentation); 704
(opinion on ultimate issue); 706 (court appointed experts); and 802 (hearsay rule).
48. The Attorney General's Office has also expressed concern over whether the
General Assembly will be precluded from legislating in the area of evidence once the
Rules are put into effect because of the constitutional authority of the Modem Courts
Amendment. See note 35 supra.
49. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 612 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by Rule 16(B)(1)(g)
and 16(C)(1)(d) of Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, if a witness uses a writing
to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying either (a) while testifying, or
(b) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the
interests ofjustice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at
the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to in-
troduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the wit-
ness. . . . (Emphasis added).
50. It is well settled that the opposing party has the right on demand to inspect and
use for cross-examination any paper or memorandum which is used by the witness on the
stand. State v. Taylor, 83 Ohio App. 76, 77 N.E.2d 279 (1947).
51. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 201, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1249
(1977); State v. Strain, 84 Ohio App. 229, 231-32, 82 N.E.2d 109, 110-12 (1948).
52. Federal Evidence Rule 612 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of
title 18, United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory
for the purpose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary
in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence
those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. . ..
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with any certainty whether the clause creating discretion in Ohio Rule
612 refers only to a writing used "(b) before testifying" or whether it
also refers to a writing used by a witness "(a) while testifying." 53
The difficulty in resolving this ambiguity can be illustrated by
comparing proposed Rule 612 with proposed Rule 407, for Rule 40714
presents a similar problem of interpretation. In this instance, however,
the ambiguity is inherited from Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Rule restates the generally accepted principle that
evidence of remedial measures taken after an event occurs is not
admissible to prove negligence in causing the event. 55 Exception to the
general rule is made, however, if the evidence is offered for another
purpose, "such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.'"56 The ambi-
guity in the proposed Rule is caused by uncertainty as to what the
condition "if controverted" applies. Does the phrase "if contro-
verted" refer only to the phrase immediately preceding it or to the
entire series preceding it in the sentence? For example, may a plaintiff
introduce evidence of remedial measures in its case-in-chief in order to
show that the defendant owned the premises on which an injury
occurred, or must ownership be controverted before the plaintiff may
introduce such evidence? Note that the syntax of the troublesome
sentence in Rule 407 is identical to the syntax in Rule 612 discussed
above. Both contain a series of words or phrases followed by a
conditional clause or phrase, but it is hot clear how much of the series
of words or phrases is made contingent upon the subsequent condition.
In order to read each rule in a way that would minimize the change in
existing law, 57 the same syntactical cofistruction would have to be
53. One commentator has provided a rationale for the change by suggesting that
Ohio attorneys have abused their right to inspect writings used prior to testifying in
conducting "fishing expeditions." See Miller, Our Witness: Testimony at Trial, 6 CAP.
U.L. REv. 555, 573 (1977). He cites no authority, however, for his assertion that there is
a right in Ohio to inspect such writings and the authors have found no cases to that
effect. Nor does Professor Miller cite authority for the proposition that this right is
abused.
54. Proposed Ohio EVidence Rule 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment.
55. Lacy v. Uganda Dev. Corp., 29 Ohio Ops. 2d 177, 195 N.E.2d 586 (Ct. App.
1964).
56. Proposed OHIO EVID. R. 407 (emphasis added).
57. It should be noted that neither in Rule 102 nor elsewhere in the Rules is it
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construed in two different ways. In other words, to minimize the extent
of change in existing law, in Rule 612 the clause "if the court in its
discretion . . ." must be read to modify only the latter phrase in the
series, i.e., "before testifying." In Rule 407, however, in order to
minimize change in the law, the clause "if controverted" must be read
to modify the entire preceding series. Is minimal change in the law
nevertheless the desired interpretation, or were Rules 407 and 612
constructed in the same way intentionally? If the latter is so, one or the
other of the Rules would substantially change existing law. How then
does one resolve whether: (1) the Rules have the same structure but are
to be construed differently; or, (2) the Rules have the same structure
and are to be construed similarly, but one or the other is intended to
change existing law? The Rules as proposed create the ambiguity but
provide no guide for resolving it.
Faced with this problem, one might hope that ambiguities such as
these would be clarified by the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee
Notes. It is one thing, however, to resort to an extrinsic, unofficial
commentary such as Advisory Committee Notes to understand the
scope of a rule that is pregnant with innovative implications; it is quite
another matter to look to an unofficial commentary simply to under-
stand the bare syntax and construction of poorly drafted rules. The
existing Ohio law on the issues covered in both Rule 407 and Rule 612
is abundantly clear and all but universally understood by the Ohio trial
bar. Are existing law and practice to be changed? The Ohio Supreme
Court intended to advance certainty and uniformity by proposing the
Ohio Rules of Evidence; 58 instead, the proposed Rules would actually
introduce confusion and uncertainty into heretofore settled evidentiary
matters.
Rule 613(B)59 is another example of seemingly poor draftsman-
ship. The Rule provides that a witness may not be impeached by
extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement unless the witness "is
suggested that when in doubt one is to construe the Rules in a way that minimizes the
change in existing law.
58. O'Neill, supra note 11, at 516.
59. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 613(B) and Federal Evidence Rule 613(b) in
pertinent part provide:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not
apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(D)(2). (Empha-
sis added).
For a recent criticism of Federal Rule 613, see Graham, Employing Inconsistent State-
ments for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed
Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607; 75 MICH. L. REV.
1565, 1601-10 (1977).
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afforded an opportunity to explain or deny" the prior, allegedly
inconsistent statement. If the witness' attention is drawn to the state-
ment, the statement may be introduced under the new Rules for the
truth of the matter contained therein. 60 The problem with the Rule as
proposed is that the impeaching party apparently may introduce proof
of the prior statement even though the witness readily admits making
the prior statement. Allowing extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent
statement when the witness admits making it departs from existing
Ohio law61 as well as from the common law. Of course, a rule is not
poorly drafted merely because it changes existing law; but this Rule is
ill conceived because there is no logic in changing the existing evi-
dence law. If a witness admits making a prior inconsistent statement,
there is simply no need to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that the
witness did make it. Yet, Rule 613(B), as copied from the Federal
Rules, seems to permit extrinsic proof even when the witness admits
the statement and tries to explain it. The Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rule 613(b) does not address this issue, although two other
rules could deal with it,62 and it is not known what the drafters of the
Ohio Rule intended. One commentator has noted, however, that pro-
posed Ohio Rule 613(B) was intended to change existing law to some
extent, 63 but he did not discuss whether it was intended to permit
cumulative proof of prior inconsistent statements.
Rules 407, 612 and 613 demonstrate that there is cause for legiti-
mate concern about the draftsmanship of the proposed Rules. Other
60. Proposed OHIO EVID. R. 801(D)(1) and proposed OHIO EvID. R. 803(24). The use
of a prior inconsistent statement to prove the matter contained in the statement rather
than merely to test the credibility of the witness is a change in Ohio evidence law. The
law of Ohio has consistently held that prior inconsistent statements may be used only to
impeach the witness' credibility. See, e.g., State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N.E.2d
535 (1938); Mills v. State, 104 Ohio St. 202, 203-05, 135 N.E. 527, 528 (1922).
61. Ohio evidence law requires that before his prior inconsistent statement may be
proved, a witness must be confronted with the statement and either have denied making
it or be unable to admit or deny. Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 270, 20 N.E.2d
522 (1939); Cincinnati Union Terminal Co. v. Banning, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 548, 553-54
(1929), where the court observed:
The rule is so well settled, as to need the citation of no authorities, that where a
witness is asked with reference to what is claimed to be inconsistent statements
and replies either that he did not make the statement or that he does not
remember, the impeaching witness's [sic] testimony is competent to go to the
jury.
62. It is possible that the Federal Rules drafters anticipated that this problem would
not arise because Federal Rules 611 and 403 give judges discretion to disallow evidence
that will waste time. This seems to be another example where the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence are relying upon discretion to operate rather than a rule of law. See
text accompanying notes 147-54 infra. The better solution would seem to be to eliminate
the ambiguity in the first instance.
63. See Miller, supra note 53, at 575.
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rules prompt concern because of their content. The Attorney General's
Office argued before the legislature's evidence rules subcommittee that
the innovations contained in some of the Rules might lead to shocking
changes, the full range of which would not become apparent until the
Rules were actually applied.
Rule 701, the lay witness opinion rule, contains one of the more
notable changes in the law of evidence. 64 It purports to remove all
restrictions from the use of opinions of lay witnesses, subject to two
rather loose limitations. First, the lay witness' opinion must be based
on the "perception of the witness" and second, the judge must feel
that the lay witness' opinion would in some way be "helpful" to the
jury. While it has been suggested that this Rule may not be as great a
change in Ohio evidence law as first appears, 65 it is, nevertheless, one
of the rules that prompted the Attorney General's office to urge delay
in the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Evidence until the federal courts
interpreted its federal counterpart. At the time it was required to pass
judgment on the proposed Rules, the legislature could not appreciate
the potential scolie of the change the rule would make in existing law.
One of the first cases interpreting Federal Rule 701, decided after
the conclusion of legislative hearings on the proposed Ohio Rules, was
United States v. Smith.66 One of three defendants was charged with
misapplication of federal funds while he was an administrator of a
federally funded employment program. 67 The trial court had permitted
a lay witness to express her opinion as to the mens rea of the
defendant; she was permitted to testify whether she thought that the
defendant "knew and understood" the law when he committed the
acts for which he was charged. 68 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion holding that such expressions of opinion are proper under Rule
701 because they might be "helpful" to the jury. 69 Admitting such an
opinion is contrary, of course, to the great weight of authority at
64. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
65. Young, Opinions and Expert Testimony, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 579, 582-83 (1977).
Current Ohio law on lay opinion testimony is stated in American La. Pipe Line Co. v.
Kennerk, 103 Ohio App. 133, 140-41, 144 N.E.2d 660, 667 (1957) (citing Balitimore &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio St. 270, 282, 1 N.E. 324, 332 (1885)) (lay witnesses
must confine their testimony to the concrete facts within their own knowledge, leaving
inferences or conclusions to be drawn by the court or jury).
66. 550 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. Id at 279-81.
68. Id. at 281.
69. Id.
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common law 70 and current Ohio law. 71 Whether the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence intended to make admissible precisely the
kind of opinion expressed in Smith cannot be determined with any
certainty, nor is it relevant. What is relevant is that Rule 701 does not
preclude the introduction of that kind of opinion, and what is more
important, the federal courts are so construing the Rule. Ohio is wise
to have delayed adoption of so open-ended a rule as Rule 701 until it
can be seen what interpretation other courts give it, for a rule of such
potential breadth neither has certain meaning nor is capable of predict-
able application. 72
Other rules do not make such obvious changes in the law, but
rather are so broadly and imprecisely written that one cannot say with
any certainty that a particular rule does not change existing law. Often,
the Rules are no more than broad statements of principle, or they create
broad areas of discretion. As a result, even the most thoughtful predic-
tion as to their possible meaning is no match for the inventiveness of
trial counsel in the press of litigation. 73 Rule 702 (expert testimony)
70. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1963 (3d Ed. 1940).
71. See American La. Pipe Co. v. Kennerk, 103 Ohio App. 133, 140-41,144 N.E. 2d
660, 667 (1957). See also note 65 supra.
72. Rule 701 illustrates that trial and appellate court rulings on evidence are no
longer predictable under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consider the results of two
recent federal bank robbery cases where the issue was the identification of the defendant
as the individual in surveillance camera photographs of the robbery. In United States v.
Calhoun, 544 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1976), the court reversed Calhoun's conviction for armed
robbery. At trial the government had offered the testimony of Calhoun's parole officer
to demonstrate that Calhoun was the same individual shown in the photographs of the
robbery. The court held that because of Federal Rules 701 and 403 the parole officer
should not have been permitted to testify as to whether the photographs resembled the
defendant. In discussing Rule 701, the court pointed to the Advisory Committee notes
which imply that the processes of the adversary system must be operative when lay
opinion is admitted. When an essential process, such as cross-examination, cannot
operate, Rule 701 cannot be used to admit lay opinion testimony. Id. at 295. The court
also found that Rule 403 supported their construction of Rule 701 because the risk of
"unfair prejudice" due to an incomplete cross-examination outweighed the probative
value of the testimony. Id. at 296.
Compare this result with United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1976),
where the defendant's conviction for bank robbery was reversed because of the trial
court's exclusion of lay witness opinion testimony. In Robinson, a correctional officer
was prepared to testify that the photo of the bank robbery indicated that the participant
was not the defendant. The court of appeals held that the testimony would have been
helpful to a determination of whether the defendant did participate in the robbery.
Thus, two courts applying the same rule have found reversible error, one in the
admission of lay witness film identification testimony and the other in its exclusion. See
Young, supra note 65, at 583.
73. As Professor Hahlo notes:
It is customary to blame the shortcomings of legislation on the draftsman who
failed to foresee problems which, looked at with "hindsight," were "obvious-
ly" bound to arise. The fact, however, is that even the best draftsmanship
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demonstrates just such a problem of interpretation. 74 On its face it does
not appear to change existing Ohio law. 75 Yet, as interpreted by a
federal appellate court, Rule 702 would work a substantial, albeit
perhaps unintended, change in Ohio law.
Under existing Ohio law and practice, it is well settled that expert
testimony is admissible if it is expressed in terms of "reasonable
scientific certainty. "76 If the expert's testimony is expressed merely in
terms of "likelihood" or anything less than "probable," the testimony
is not admissible. 77 In United States v. Cyphers,78 however, the
Seventh Circuit found no error in the admission of expert testimony
that certain specimen hairs "could have come" from the defendant, 79
because Rule 702 vests the trial judge with "broad discretion. . . to
decide whether expert testimony may assist the jury's deliberation.'" 80
cannot prevent future disputes on the interpretation of statutory provisions.
"No finite wisdom can provide for the infinite and unknown variety and
complexity of future cases." The impossibility of foreseeing the future and the
imperfections of language insure that there will always be debatable points in
the application of a statutory rule to borderline cases.
Hahlo, Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace, 30 MOD. L. REV. 241, 250 (1967).
74. See Young, supra note 65, at 584. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 702 provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise."
75. See Young, supra note 65, at 584. Compare proposed OHIO EvID. R. 702 with
McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman, II Ohio St. 2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 304 (1967) (syllabus).
76. State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969) (expert testimony
concerning neutron activation analysis to be admissible must be to a reasonable scientific
certainty); Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156
(1943) (testimony of expert witness in workmen's compensation case must establish
direct causal relationship of injury to disability with reasonable medical certainty).
77. 17 Ohio St. 2d at 85, 246 N.E.2d at 368.
78. 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977). The court in Cyphers distinguished the Ohio law by
saying that in Holt the expert was giving a conclusion while the expert in Cyphers was
expressing an opinion. This is a distinction without a difference.
79. Id. at 1071-72.
80. Id. at 1072. For a discussion of the impact of Federal Rule 702 on the "rea-
sonable scientific certainty" requirement, see McElhaney, 'Expert Witnesses and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV. 463, 479-80 (1977). The content of Rules
703 and 705 also cause concern because of what they clearly say, not because of their
uncertainty or imprecision. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Substantial uncertainty exists as to whether the supreme court has the power to promul-
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If the Rules are adopted and Ohio courts follow Cyphers, Rule 702
would dramatically alter Ohio law.
Finally, perhaps the most striking example of both poor draftsman-
ship and troublesome content is Rule 402.81 It asserts the major tenet of
the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: subject to certain limitations, all
relevant evidence is admissible, and all evidence that is irrelevant is
inadmissible. The Rule provides specifically that evidence otherwise
relevant may nevertheless be rendered inadmissible by several causes,
one of which is an "Act of Congress." That provision is incorporated
into the proposed Ohio Rules from the Federal Rules of Evidence. As
it is written, the "Act of Congress" language would make Ohio's own
law of evidence subject to congressional legislation.
The easiest explanation for the language is that its inclusion is a
mere oversight, but a close analysis of the Rules does not support this
interpretation. The phrase "Act of Congress" appears in nine separate
places in the Federal Rules of Evidence, eight of which could be
carried over to the state rules. 82 Because the Ohio draftsmen deleted
four 83 of the eight references when they adapted the Federal Rules for
use in the Ohio courts, one must infer that in those four instances the
draftsmen concluded that reference to federal legislation was inappro-
priate. One may conclude that where the draftsmen retained the refer-
ence to federal legislation," 4 they did so after similar consideration. In
gate such rules regulating the use of expert witnesses at least in criminal trials and
proceedings, because a specific constitutional provision, Ohio Constitution, article II,
§ 39, gives this responsibility to the legislature. Article II, § 39, states that: "Laws may
be passed for the regulation of the use of expert witnesses and expert testimony in
criminal trials and proceedings." Apparently the advisory committee did not assess the
impact of this amendment on the proposed Ohio Evidence Rules. For a discussion of the
operation of Federal Rules 703 and 705, see McElhaney, supra at 480-89.
81. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by
Act of Congress, by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict
with an existing rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible. (Emphasis added).
82. The phrase "Act of Congress" is contained in Federal Rules 301 (presumptions);
402 (admissibility); 501 (privileges); 802 (hearsay); 901(10) (authentication by methods
provided by statute or rule); 902(4) (self-authentication, certified copies of public
records); 902(10) (self-authentication by presumptions under Acts of Congress); 1002
(requirement of original); and 1103 (title).
83. Reference to federal legislation is deleted from Ohio Rules 301, 501, 901(10), and
1002.
84. Reference to federal legislation is retained in Ohio Rules 402, 802, 902(4), and
902(10). Rules 402 and 802 specifically refer to "Act of Congress," while 902(4) and
902(10) have been modified somewhat to refer to "any law of the United States."
The intended meaning of the phrase "Act of Congress" is clear at least as far as the
Federal Rules are concerned. Federal Rule 410 as enacted states: "Except as otherwise
provided in this rule," but the House Committee had recommended "Except . . . by
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other words, unless one assumes that the Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee randomly deleted some of the references to congressional
acts, one must conclude that where the phrase "Act of Congress" was
retained, the committee did so as a result of a deliberate choice.
Furthermore, in comparing the wording of the Ohio Rule with that of
the Federal Rule,85 we may infer that because the Ohio drafters
changed the language surrounding the phrase "Act of Congress" they
considered the inclusion of that phrase as well.86
Whether the inclusion was due to a mere oversight or to an
intentional choice, the effects of this language are so profound as to
warrant careful and serious consideration. Rule 402, as proposed, is a
curious innovation in theory and a startling innovation in practice. It is
curious in theory because it is difficult to conceive why Ohio might
choose to make its own local evidence law subject to federal legisla-
tion. Note that what is made subject to federal legislation is not just
evidentiary principles found to exist in the Constitution of the United
States.87 Rather, the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence would retain
not only federal control over Ohio's local evidence law in areas of
constitutional concern, but it would expand that control to include any
evidentiary matter on which Congress might choose to legislate.
This innovation is all the more striking when one compares the
broad authority given to Congress with the restricted authority given to
the Ohio General Assembly. Rule 402 would allow the Ohio legisla-
ture to make relevant evidence inadmissible only if the legislation is
"not in conflict with an existing rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio." 88
Act of Congress." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7082. The Conference Committee Report indicates that the
enacted language means that any subsequent Act of Congress which is inconsistent with
Rule 410 will supersede it. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7100.
85. Federal Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
86. Of the other states that have adopted rules based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Nebraska and North Dakota retain the phrase "Act of Congress" in their
rules equivalent to Federal Rule 402.
87. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
88. Proposed OHIO EvID. R. 402. The precise meaning of this phrase is elusive. It
might mean at least two very different things. The ambiguity centers on the word
"existing." If it refers to supreme court rules in effect at the time legislation affecting
admissibility is passed, then it suggests that the General Assembly is free to pass any
law affecting admissibility of evidence so long as the supreme court had not issued a rule
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Congress, on the other hand, is conceded the power to supersede
virtually any existing evidence rule of the Ohio Supreme Court. Pro-
posed Ohio Rule of Evidence 402 does not appear, at least, to limit
the effect of an Act of Congress in the same way that the power of the
state's own legislative body is restricted. Thus, once over the novelty
of making local evidence questions subject to federal legislation, a
certain anomaly remains in allowing Congress great power to preempt
the state court rules while limiting that power in the hands of the Ohio
General Assembly, the legislative body more directly and intimately
aware of local policy and concems.89
This language of Rule 402 is striking as a practical matter as well.
An example will demonstrate the practical effect of making the admis-
sion of evidence subject to an "Act of Congress." Discovery in
federal criminal cases of statements and reports in the hands of the
government is controlled by the Jencks Act.90 That statute makes a
witness' testimony inadmissible if the government chooses not to
comply with certain specific disclosure requirements. The Jencks Act
is broader in its disclosure provisions than current Ohio criminal
discovery rules. 91 Proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 402 raises the very
real possibility that the Jencks Act will be controlling law in Ohio
prosecutions. A similar prospect exists with respect to other federal
covering the issue. Once the supreme court issues a rule, inconsistent legislation is
repealed. This interpretation is consistent with article IV, § 5(B) of the Ohio Constitu-
tion. The problem is that this construction renlers the word "existing" wholly redundant
and thus is not likely to be the intended interpretation.
As a second interpretation, the word "existing" might refer to supreme court rules
already in operation "at the time the Rules of Evidence take effect." This interpretation
gives the word "existing" some meaning, albeit perhaps arbitrary. It would mean that
the legislature may pass laws respecting the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence
provided only that it may not legislate on any matter on which the supreme court had
already issued a rule at the time the Ohio Rules of Evidence take effect. This interpreta-
tion seems unwise if only because it would tie the legislature's power to act to the state of
the supreme court's rules at an arbitrary moment in history.
The meaning of this phrase is all the more puzzling in light of the question whether
the legislature may enact laws with respect to evidence at all if rules of evidence
proposed by the supreme court are "rules of practice and procedure" within the meaning
of Ohio Constitution, article IV, § 5(B).
89. The anomaly is more pointed when one considers the procedure for amending
the Evidence Rules. The General Assembly is precluded by proposed Ohio Rule 402
from enacting any legislation inconsistent with a supreme court evidence rule. Rather,
changes in the Rules must be proposed by the supreme court and transmitted to the
General Assembly for consideration. See Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B). Yet by Rule 402,
Congress would have authority to change the Ohio evidence law even on nonconstitu-
tional matters although neither the Ohio Supreme Court nor the General Assembly has
any review or veto over the congressional action.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
91. Compare 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1970) with OHIO CRIM. R. 16.
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statutes pertaining to the admissibility of evidence. 92
In short, the inclusion of "Act of Congress" in proposed Rule 402
and elsewhere would work far-reaching and uncontrollable changes in
Ohio evidence law. While it appears that the drafters deliberately
chose to retain the "Act of Congress" language, the consequences of
that choice appear not to have been adequately analyzed.
B. The Larger Concerns
Although there are numerous instances of troublesome draftsman-
ship and content in the proposed Rules, the strongest objection of the
Attorney General's Office is to the vast, unprecedented discretion
granted to trial judges by the proposed Rules. Discretion recognized by
the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence ranges from the trial judge's
traditional discretion in controlling such matters as the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses to several newly conceived areas of discre-
tion. There are a number of examples of the latter. Rule 40393 express-
ly confers power upon the trial judge to exclude evidence that is
otherwise clearly admissible under some other principle of evidence if
the judge, for example, feels that the evidence will "waste. . .time"
or mislead the jury. The breadth of discretion given by Rule 403 is as
broad as the Rules of Evidence themselves, for on its face Rule 403
"apparently cuts across the entire body of the Rules, and allows ad hoc
exclusion where prejudice, time and the like are deemed to outweigh
probativity.'' 4 Rule 70195 allows the introduction of lay opinion
testimony if rationally based on perception and if the judge feels the
lay witness' opinion will be "helpful" to the jury. Rule 70596 makes it
92. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) (admissibility of confessions); 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (1970) (wiretap and electronic surveillance). A study of the full extent to which
federal statutes control or influence admission of evidence in federal civil and criminal
cases was not undertaken by the authors, nor it seems, by the Ohio Supreme Court or its
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee.
93. Federal Evidence Rule 403 and proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 403 are identical.
Both provide:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
94. Rothstein, Some Themes in Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J.
21, 29 (1974); see also, Dolan, Rule 403, The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 220 (1976).
95. Both Federal Rule 701 and proposed Ohio Rule 701 provide:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
96. Federal Rule 705 and Proposed Ohio Rule 705 both provide that:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
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a matter of the judge's discretion whether to require an expert witness
to disclose the facts and data that underlie an expert's opinion. Rule
70697 gives the trial judge discretion to select and appoint his own
expert witnesses. Rules 803(24)98 and 804(B)(6) 99 confer new, broad
discretion on the trial judge to fashion his own, case-by-case excep-
tions to the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible.
Over twenty of the proposed Rules expressly allow the exercise of
judicial discretion, many in areas where the law of evidence had never
before recognized the matter to be within the discretionary power of
the trial judge.1 °° The discretion created by the Rules of Evidence,
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
97. Federal Evidence Rule 706 and proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 706 are virtually
identical with regard to the trial judge's authority to appoint his own expert. Except for
the bracketed portion, which appears in the Federal Rule but not in Ohio's version, both
rules in pertinent part provide:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint [any expert
witness agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint] expert witnesses of its
own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he
consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the
court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference
in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so ap-
pointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be
taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He
shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling
him as a witness.
98. Federal Rule 803(24) and proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 803(24) are identical in
providing that:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [can be
admitted] if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence
of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
99. Federal Rule 804(b)(5) and proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 804(B)(6) are identical
to each other and to both Federal Rule 803(24) and proposed Ohio Evidence Rule
803(24).
100. Discretion is expressly granted in some form in at least twenty of the proposed
Ohio Rules of Evidence: Rules 103, 104, 106, 201, 403, 404, 608, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615,
701, 702, 705, 706, 803, 804, 1003 and 1006. Some merely recognize matters traditionally
considered within the trial court's discretion: Rule 611(A) (court control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence). Other discretionary rules
are innovative: Rule 706(A) (appointment of experts by the court), and Rule 803(24) and
its companion provision in 804(B)(6) (residual hearsay exceptions). The remainder of the
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however, is far broader and more radical than first appears on the face
of those rules that expressly grant discretion. Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit decision in United States v. Batts'01 illustrates that even those
rules that are mandatory on their face may be interpreted to be discre-
tionary.
In Batts the defendant had been cross-examined about specific
instances of prior misconduct.1 2 Unhappy with the defendant's re-
sponse, the cross-examiner introduced on rebuttal extrinsic evidence in
the form of conflicting testimony to impeach the defendant with proof
of alleged prior misconduct. 103 Rule 608(b) expressly prohibits use of
extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness in this manner. 1 4 The trial
judge, however, admitted the extrinsic evidence and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the trial court has threshold discretion in decid-
ing whether to apply a particular rule of evidence even though the rule
itself is mandatory by its language.105 The court reasoned that because
the overriding purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence as stated in
Rule 102106 is to ascertain truth, a single rule of evidence must not be
read in isolation.0 7 Thus, a trial judge must be given discretion to
Rules, to the extent that they announce a rule of evidence at all, are on their face
categorically mandatory or prohibitory. See, e.g., Rule 605 (the judge presiding at a trial
may not testify in that trial as a witness).
Surprisingly little scholarly criticism exists in this country analyzing the effect of
judicial discretion on the nature of the legal process. There is no judicial counterpart to
Professor Davis' important work on administrative discretion. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). See, e.g., R. BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF
TRIAL COURTS (1931); I. LEE & B. OVERTON, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1974); Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635
(1971). Finally it is notable that criticism has also been leveled at the proposed Canadian
Evidence Code. Portions of the proposed Canadian Code are similar to the proposed
Ohio Rules of Evidence in that they broaden trial court discretion to fashion new rules on
a case-by-case basis. See Anderson, A Criticisn of the Evidence Code: Some Practical
Considerations, 11 U. BRIT. COL. L. REV. 163 (1977).
101. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. The defendant was charged with certain crimes relating to hashish. When ar-
rested he had a "coke" spoon around his neck. At trial, he denied on cross-examination
any knowledge that the "coke" spoon is commonly used to sniff cocaine. Id at 514-16.
103. The government produced testimony that several months before the defendant
had sold a large amount of cocaine to an undercover agent. No conviction resulted,
however, because of an illegal search and seizure. Id. at 516.
104. Federal Evidence Rule 608(b) in pertinent part provides: "Specific instances of
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other
than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence."
105. 558 F.2d at 517.
106. Federal Rule, 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
107. 558 F.2d at 517.
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ignore a rule of evidence, even one that Congress chose to make
mandatory, if he believes that the whole "truth" as he perceived it,
might not be served.
The result reached in Batts is not so startling as the reasoning
suggesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence are to be followed at trial
only so long as the judge believes that the evidence presented to the
jury accurately reflects the judge's perception of what is the true state of
affairs. It is important to note, as a measure of the breadth of the trial
judge's discretion under this view, that when the court of appeals
licensed the trial judge to suspend the Federal Rule in the service of
truth, it neither held nor suggested that suspension of the Federal Rules
of Evidence reinstates the common law rule on the issue. The trial
judge's pursuit of truth is thus utterly without guide or rule, except for
the subjective beacon of truth itself.
Rule 102 is not the only rule with so broad an application. As noted
above, Rule 403 cuts across the entire body of evidence rules by
empowering the trial judge to exclude evidence that is otherwise
entirely relevant, material, and competent if he feels, for example, that
the evidence might mislead the jury or that hearing the evidence would
waste time. 1°8 Rules that grant a trial judge broad license to depart
from established evidence principles whenever his sense of justice, or
some equally vague urge, so moves him are often tantamount to having
no rules at all. These broad discretionary exceptions introduced in the
Federal Rules are carried into the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence
and constitute the most disturbing feature of both.
108. Potential abuse of this broad power has been noted. Professor Dolan observed
that: "Criticism has been leveled at the prejudice rule because the trial judge has
tremendous discretionary power to shape the factfinder's decision so that it will har-
monize with the judge's perceptions of a 'correct' result." Dolan, supra note 94, at 227.
See also text accompanying notes 93-94 supra. The problems raised by proposed Ohio
Evidence Rule 403 were raised decades ago by critics of the Model Code of Evidence
which contained a provision similar to Rule 403. Judge Van Voorhis of the New York
Court of Appeals observed:
I do maintain that it would require a very unusual trial judge indeed to be able to
apply many of the provisions of this Code where an arbitrary discretion is
confided to the trial judge without any standards which he is to follow in the
rendering of a decision. It seems to me that to permit a trial judge in his
discretion to exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is outweighed
by the risks and its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time is a
dangerous provision. . . . I certainly do not think that the judge should have
the power to exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value will necessi-
tate undue consumption of time . . . I say frankly I have known judges who
would close the case and go fishing. . . I wonder if it be realized that under this
proposed Code every judge would have a different view, no matter how able,
concerning . . . how much probative value evidence must have to justify
consuming the time of the court. . ..
19 Amer. Law Inst. Proceedings 220-21 (1942), quoted in I J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE
403[02] (1976).
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The troublesome nature of these broad discretionary rules can best
be demonstrated by considering proposed Ohio Evidence Rule
803(24). Article VIII of the proposed Ohio Rules 1°9 sets forth the rules
pertaining to hearsay. Rule 802 categorically prohibits the introduction
of hearsay evidence. 110 Rule 803, however, lists twenty-four excep-
tions that permit the introduction of hearsay evidence regardless of its
hearsay quality or the availability of the out-of-court declarant. The
first twenty-three exceptions more or less reflect the generally recog-
nized common law exceptions to the hearsay rule."' For example,
Rule 803(1) attempts to codify the "present sense impression" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule recognized at common law."12 Rule 803(24)
109. Article VIII was one of the most controversial features of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and it significantly liberalized the common law hearsay rule. Despite volumi-
nous commentary one collateral effect of broader hearsay exceptions has received rela-
tively little attention: the burden placed on the opponent when hearsay is more freely
admitted. Very often, if not generally, the proponent of hearsay evidence is the party
with the burden of persuasion on the issue to which the hearsay is relevant. Whenever
hearsay evidence is admitted, however, the proponent of the evidence is relieved of the
ordinary burden of producing the declarant in court. That is the very purpose of the
hearsay exceptions. Thus, broader exceptions to the hearsay rule make it easier for the
proponent to establish his case. Of course, this has the complimentary effect of increas-
ing the burden on the adverse party. Whenever hearsay is admitted, the burden shifts to
the opponent to search out and produce the "invisible witness," in order to preserve his
right to inquire into the declarant's ability to perceive, his memory, his credibility, prior
inconsistent statements and other matters that the party against whom the hearsay is
offered would be entitled to explore if the witness were produced. The result of
permitting greater use of hearsay is ironic, for as a practical matter it places the burden
of producing a witness on the party against whom the witness has evidence. Thus, freer
use of hearsay places adverse counsel in an ever more frequent dilemma: either he
produces the witness who has evidence against his client's interest, or he gives up the
opportunity to inquire of the witness and thus the opportunity to limit the effect of his
damaging hearsay testimony. Professor Rothstein has perceptively suggested these
effects of freer admissibility of hearsay. See Rothstein, supra note 94, at 26-27.
110. Ohio Evidence Rule 802 provides:
Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by Act of
Congress, by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with an
existing rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
11. See generally, Blackmore, Some Things About Hearsay: Article VIII, 6 CAP
U.L. REV. 597, 606-22 (1977).
112. Under the present sense impression exception, if A, while witnessing an acci-
dent, states that X ignored the red light, witness B can testify at a trial that A said that X
ran the red light. It makes no difference that A himself may be present and fully capable
of testifying to his observations. So long as A made the out-of-court statement while
perceiving the event, anyone hearing the statement may relate it in court for the truth of
the matter asserted.
Criticism has already been leveled at Federal Evidence Rule 803(1) in that, as written,
it is capable of an interpretation that would widely depart from the common law
exception. See Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New
Day for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22, 23-24 (1975). Professor Waltz concludes
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adds, however, a new exception to the hearsay rule. It provides that
evidence may be admitted even though it is hearsay and even though it
does not fall within any of the twenty-three generally recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The trial judge is given discretion to
admit any hearsay if he determines that the hearsay has "circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to the first twenty-three
exceptions, and if he determines that the interests of justice require
admission of the hearsay evidence.113 This type of nonspecific excep-
tion licensing the trial judge to deviate from the hearsay rule and its
exceptions has never been recognized as a part of the evidence law of
Ohio. 1
14
that Rule 803(1) is "an awesomely elastic exception to the rule against hearsay." Id. at
24. Indeed, Josiah Blackmore, an Evidence Rules Advisory Committee Staff member,
has cautioned that the Rule as proposed in Ohio, while useful, requires further analysis
of its potential operation and use. Blackmore, supra note 11, at 607-08.
113. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 803(24) requires also that the hearsay evidence be
of a material fact and that it be more probative than any other evidence that the
proponent could reasonably be expected to obtain.
114. The authors have found no case authority in Ohio that recognizes a trial judge's
discretion to fashion his own exceptions to the hearsay rule to fit his individual sense of
what justice requires in the case before him. In addition, Professor Weinstein charac-
terized Rules 803(24) and 803(B)(6) as "the most notable changes from prior Ohio
practice." Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 517,
528-29 n.35 (1977). But see Erion v. Timken Co., 52 Ohio App. 2d 123, 130-31 (1977),
where the court observed that proposed Ohio Evidence Rules 803(24) and 804(B)(6)
merely formalize "the Ohio rule for this particular matter of hearsay." The court did not
characterize the nature of "this particular matter of hearsay," so the reader is left to
speculate for himself what specific kinds of hearsay the court felt Ohio law relegates to
the discretionary power of Ohio trial judges. Nor did the court cite any authority for its
conclusion that the discretion contained in proposed Ohio Rules 803(24) and 804(B)(6)
reflects "the Ohio rule." None exists.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted its disapproval of creating discretion on
issues that are capable of resolution by legal principles. See American Guar. Co. v.
McNiece, Ill Ohio St. 532, 146 N.E. 77 (1924), where the court stated:
We have no patience with any theory which would permit each separate case of
a class which may be determined by the same general principles to become sui
generis, for the reason that the doctrine sui generis tends to supplant the
fundamental principle that rights and liabilities are such by law rather than by
the conscience of the particular tribunal who may be called upon to determine
them.
Id. at 547, 146 N.E. at 81.
Those who have searched in other jurisdictions have also concluded that a discretion-
ary hearsay exception is unprecedented. E.g., Hughes, Horwitz, Koenig, Shields &
Wolfe, Comparison of the New FederalRules of Evidence and Rules of Evidence Applied
in Massachusetts Courts, 60 MAss. L.Q. 125, 158 (1975) (the authors conclude that:
"[t]here is no Massachusetts counterpart to this newly-created and broadly inclusive
federal exception to the hearsay rule"); Robinson, The Impact of Federal Rules of
Evidence on Michigan Evidence Law, 54 MICH. ST. B.J. 193, 203 (1975) (the author
concludes that although a few cases have "interpreted existing hearsay exceptions to
justify admission of certain questionable extra-judicial statements," there "is no Michi-
gan law equivalent to Federal Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)"); Tait, The New Federal
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Several aspects of Rule 803(24) concern the Attorney General's
Office. The first is the language of the Rule itself, for it is limited only
by the standard of equivalent trustworthiness. The very presence of a
broad, open-ended, catchall exception to the hearsay rule has the
potential for reducing the other twenty-three specifically worded ex-
ceptions in Rule 803 to so many general, directory principles which the
trial judge is free to follow or not according to his own sense of justice.
Each of the twenty-three exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in
803(1) to 803(23) has within it limitations on its scope and operation.
For example, Rule 803(8)115 allows into evidence hearsay in the form
of governmental reports to prove the truth of the matters contained in
them, provided that police reports can be introduced in a criminal trial
only by a defendant and not by the prosecution. Rule 803(22)116 admits
evidence of prior convictions only if the crime was a felony. Rule
803(24), however, threatens to reduce exceptions such as these to mere
suggestions because it allows a judge to admit, through the catchall
exception, hearsay that does not fit the limitations in the other twenty-
three specifically worded exceptions. For example, must a judge
necessarily exclude evidence of a misdemeanor conviction? Must the
Rules of Evidence: A Summary of the Differences Between the Rules and the Connecticut
Law of Evidence, 9 CONN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1976) (the author observes that: "Connecticut
has never overtly recognized such a residual exception"); Wendorf, Should Texas Adopt
the Federal Rules of Evidence?, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 249, 274 (1976) (the author concludes
there is no precedent in Texas for such a rule); Note, Symposium on the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted, 12 LAND AND WATER REV. 601,
708 (1977) (the author concludes that there is no similar rule in Wyoming); cf. Comment,
A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169, 193
(1976) (Virginia adheres to the strict common law hearsay rule and its exceptions).
115. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 803(8) provides for this exception to the hearsay
rule:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (a) the activities of the office or agency, or (b)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, unless offered by defend-
ant, or (c) factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, in civil actions and proceedings and against the state
or political subdivision thereof in criminal cases unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Factual findings
shall not include either opinions or evaluations not otherwise admissible.
116. Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 803(22) provides for this exception to the hearsay
rule:
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty
(but not upon a plea of no contest or the equivalent plea from another juris-
diction), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment,
but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution
for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissi-
bility.
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trial judge necessarily exclude a police report offered by the prosecu-
tion? Rules 803(22) and 803(8) on their face clearly prohibit the
introduction of such evidence. But it would seem that either piece of
evidence could be adtmitted under Rule 803(24). Assume that the
criteria of materiality and absence of a better source for the evidence
are met. The two other standards the trial judge is to apply in con-
sidering hearsay evidence offered under Rule 803(24) are, first,
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and, sec-
ond, his own sense of what justice requires. With respect to the first
standard, a misdemeanor conviction has no fewer circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness than a felony conviction. Nor does a
police report have fewer circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
when offered by the prosecution than when offered by the defense. As
for the second standard, a particular judge's sense of justice is wholly
subjective and not a specific or meaningful restriction on the potential
scope or use of Rule 803(24). Thus, nothing in the proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence suggests that Rule 803(24) should not be so used to
circumvent the limitations in the specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Indeed, use of Federal Rule 803(24) in this way has already been
advocated. 117
Not only does Rule 803(24) potentially eliminate what limitations
117. See, e.g., Comment, The Admissibility of Police Reports Under the FederalRules
of Evidence, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 691, 700 (1977); cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 Denver
Colo., 439 F. Supp. 393, 411 (11 Colo. 1977) (court approved use of 803(24) to circum-
vent the limitations of 803(6)). But see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977),
where the court demonstrated that Congress simply could not have intended rule 803(24)
to be used so broadly.
By contrast, a somewhat more expansive view of Federal Rule 803(24) was expressed
in United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which
was decided between the time of argument and decision in Oates. The court was
presented with the argument that Congress did not intend Federal Rule 803(24) to be used
except in the most exceptional circumstances, and it rejected the reference to congres-
sional intent, noting that the rules themselves do not express any such limitation. The
court even implied that such a limitation makes no practical sense because of the
inherent vagueness of a concept of "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 866. The trial
judge in American Cyanamid,,refusing to be bound by either the Advisory Notes or the
legislative history, stated that:
Neither the Rule, nor the cases in this Circuit interpreting the Rule, .. impose
any express limitation concerning exceptional cases. To every criminal defend-
ant, his own case is exceptional. Rule 803(24) establishes sufficient express
criteria which must be satisfied before an item of hearsay will be admissi-
ble. . . . There is no requirement that the court find a case to be "exception-
al," whatever that means, in order to receive any evidence. To imply such a
provision, as suggested by the Judicial Committee, . . . would negate the
requirement of Rule 102, F.R. Evid. that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
Id. at 865-66.
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there are, in the specific Rule 803 exceptions to the hearsay rule, but it
may also reach beyond Rule 803 and negate other express limitations
on the use of hearsay evidence.118 Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(1), for
example, provides that prior inconsistent statements by'a witness who
testifies at trial may be introduced for the truth of the matter asserted in
the prior out-of-court statement if the prior inconsistent statement was
given "under oath . . at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,[' 91 or in
a deposition." 120 In United States v. Leslie,121 the Fifth Circuit,
interpreting Federal Rule 801(d)(1), held that a prior inconsistent
statement that could not be admitted under Rule 801(d)(1) because it
was not a statement under oath may nevertheless be admitted under the
catchall terms of Rule 803(24). 122
A hearsay rule that has as broad an exception as Rule 803(24) is
virtually no rule at all, for under such a broad exception fits any piece
of hearsay that a trial judge feels has "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." The license given trial judges by so vague a standard
caused the Supreme Court of Maine to eliminate Rule 803(24) entirely
from the Maine Rules of Evidence considering it "a guideline which
the most conscientious of judges would find difficult to follow."' 123
118. It has been suggested that the presence of Federal Rule 803(24) renders Federal
Rule 804(b)(5), the other hearsay catchall exception, wholly superfluous. J. WALTZ, THE
NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 171 (2d ed. 1975). The author observes that any
hearsay that might be admissible under Federal Rule 804(b)(5) is also admissible under
Federal Rule 803(24). That analysis is logically valid. Rule 804 lists hearsay exceptions
for situations where the declarant is unavailable, while Rule 803 lists hearsay exceptions
that apply regardless of the declarant's availability. The latter completely subsumes the
condition on which the former becomes operative, so that Rule 804(b)(5) is entirely
unnecessary.
119. The potential scope of this phrase is demonstrated by United States v. Castro-
Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976). In that case, three of the government's witnesses
testified at trial favorably to the accused. The government then impeached its own
witnesses under authority of Federal Rule 607 by introducing as nonhearsay, and thus
for the truth of the matter asserted, their prior inconsistent statements made at an
immigration investigation. The court of appeals affirmed the substantive use of the prior
statements, holding that such an interrogation conducted by a border patrol agent was an
"other proceeding" encompassed by Federal Rule 801(d)(1).
120. Under Federal Rule 801(d)(1) the prior inconsistent statements in Castro-Ayon
were admitted to prove the content of the prior statement, not just to test the witness'
credibility. This is a change in existing law for presently the prior out-of-court statement
is hearsay and may be admitted for the limited purpose of testing the witness' credibility.
See Mills v. State, 104 Ohio St. 202, 203-05, 135 N.E. 527, 528 (1922); Mahoning Nat'l
Bank v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 28 Ohio L. Abs. 619, 625 (Ct. App. 1939). For
a recent criticism of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A), see Graham, Employing Inconsistent
Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Pro-
posed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1565, 1568-93 (1977).
121. 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 289-91.
123. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 803-250, at 88-89 (Dec. 1977 Supp.).
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The Court decided not to adopt any catch-all provision ...
It concluded . . . that despite the purported safeguards,
there was a serious risk that trial judges would differ greatly
in applying the elastic standard of equivalent trustworthi-
ness. The result would be lack of uniformity which would
make preparation for trial difficult. Nor would it be likely
that the Law Court on appeal could effectively apply correc-
tive measures. There would indeed be doubt whether an
affirmance of an admission of evidence under the catch-all
provision amounted to the creation of a new exception with
the force of precedent or merely a refusal to rule that the trial
judge had abused his discretion. 24
Cases already decided under Federal Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)
suggest that federal courts are willing to admit some remarkable
hearsay evidence "in the interests of justice." The Eighth Circuit
decision in United States v. Carlson 125 is illustrative.
In Carlson, three defendants were charged with various drug
offenses. A witness testified before the grand jury but refused to testify
at trial, first citing his fifth amendment privilege and then, after being
granted immunity, alleging that he feared for his life. He would not,
however, specifically identify the person who caused his fears. Al-
though the witness' grand jury testimony was damaging to two of the
three persons indicted, the trial judge concluded that the defendant
Carlson was the cause of the witness' fear. The trial court admitted the
witness' grand jury testimony, which had not been subject to cross-
examination, as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.
126
The court of appeals found no error in admitting grand jury tes-
timony on the issue of guilt even though the accused at no time was
given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness. The
court conceded that "we have not been cited nor have we found any
case in which an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony was ad-
mitted as substantive evidence at trial to reflect on defendant's
guilt."' 27 Nor was the hearsay testimony admissible under any of the
specific exceptions to the hearsay rule contained in Federal Rules 803
or 804. The only authority relied upon by the court of appeals for the
introduction of the uncross-examined grand jury testimony as evidence
of guilt was the ad hoc exception contained in Federal Rule 804(b)(5).
124. Id.
125. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), noted in United
States v. Carlson: Eighth Circuit Implies Waiver of Accused's Express Confrontation
Right, 22 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1977).
126. 547 F.2d at 1352-53.
127. Id. at 1359.
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The court of appeals realized that its decision to permit uncross-
examined testimony on the issue of guilt might present some problems
in light of the constitutional right of confrontation. Although the-court
observed that the "contours of the confrontation clause" of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution are not very clear, it
declined to consider the constitutional implications of its decision. 128
Rather, the court noted that "[a]t the outset we accept, based upon the
District Court's findings and the evidence adduced at the trial court
proceedings, that [the witness] refused to testify because of threats
directed against him by Carlson." 1 29 From there, the court of appeals
reasoned that whatever the sixth amendment implications may be in
allowing the use of uncross-examined testimony to convict, Carlson
waived any objection he may have had when he was found to have
threatened the witness.
The Carlson court noted that "[s]anctioning the use of grand jury
testimony under these circumstances at trial may have wide ramifica-
tions in the criminal justice system." 13 But the ramifications of
Carlson are not limited to criminal cases; the court's use of the catch-
all hearsay exception to allow introduction of unprecedented hearsay is
equally applicable to civil cases. Consider as an example an accident
case in Ohio witnessed by an out-of-state resident. Assume counsel
sends an adjuster or investigator who takes a completely noncollusive,
sworn statement from the witness. Even if the witness is discovered
before trial, he may not be deposed, especially if the witness appears to
have only cumulative evidence. If the witness is subpoenaed to testify
at trial but, for whatever reason, chooses to ignore the subpoena
(something an out-of-state resident is entirely free to do), the situation
is essentially the same as that presented in Carlson. Using Carlson as
precedent the trial judge in his discretion 31 may admit the absent
witness' sworn statement if the judge finds "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" for the statement. The only way to distinguish the
hypothetical civil case from the Carlson situation is to maintain that
the testimony given before a grand jury is inherently more trustworthy
than testimony given to a notary public. The Attorney General's Office
can find neither comfort nor substance in that distinction.
The implications of Carlson and the open-ended hearsay excep-
tions are profound. Practicing trial lawyers and trial judges have
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1353.
130. Id. at 1357.
131. The court in Carlson observed that a trial court in applying the hearsay catchall
exception "has a wide latitude of discretion in determining the trustworthiness of a
statement." Id. at 1354.
1978]
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proceeded for years on the general premise that if one is to prove his
case, one had better have his witnesses in court prepared to testify.
Rule 803(24) makes it possible to establish a case without subjecting
witnesses to cross-examination in infinitely more situations than the
comparatively few and narrow instances recognized in the common
law hearsay exceptions. An open-ended exception such as 803(24)
invites imaginative lawyers to mold circumstances so that evidence
gets in but the rigors of cross-examination are avoided. Moreover, a
catchall exception to the hearsay rule encourages the filing of cases
that finite, narrowly drawn exceptions would preclude, on the hope
that a judge will be moved by his personal sense of justice to admit
hearsay that the common law would have excluded. It may also prompt
a lawyer to file a case based on such hearsay evidence simply to coerce
a settlement, playing on his opponent's fear that a judge might admit
the hearsay. Proposed Ohio Rule 803(24) and 804(B)(6) are open
invitations to lawyers to increase the use of uncross-examined tes-
timony "in the interest of justice." 132
The Attorney General's deeper concern with Rule 803(24) is that it
virtually eliminates the hearsay rule as a rule of law. 133 The common
law hearsay rule, together with its exceptions, is a rule of law in
Ohio.134 Because the trial court in ruling on hearsay issues rules as a
matter of law, a reviewing court is entitled to substitute its judgment on
132. For a discussion of some of the collateral effects of increased use of hearsay
testimony, see note 109 supra.
133. In addition, the proposed expansion of the hearsay exceptions as applicable to
criminal cases may be unconstitutional in Ohio. The Ohio Constitution provides: "[I]n
any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed. . . to meet the witnesses face
to face." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10. Less than five years after the reiteration of that
provision in the revised Constitution of 1851, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered its
meaning and operation. In Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325 (1856), the court stated:
This, like numerous other provisions in the bill of rights, is a constitutional
guaranty of one of the great fundamental principles well established, and long
recognized at common law, both in England and in this country. The scope and
operation of it are clearly defined and well understood, in the common law
recognition of it; and the assertion of it in the fundamental law of the State, was
designed neither to enlarge nor curtail it in its operation, but to give it perma-
nency, and secure it against the power of change or innovation.
Id. at 340 (emphasis added). Yet, the residual hearsay provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence "[open] the door to a whole new world of hearsay exceptions and permit the
development of the hearsay rule in the future through judicial enlargement. This excep-
tion [Rule 803(24)] and Rule 804(b)(5) confer broad discretion to create exceptions to the
hearsay rule based on trustworthiness." Wood, The Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 Tax.
B.J. 535, 539 (1975) (emphasis added). The Modern Courts Amendment, OHIO CoNsT.
art. IV, § 5, as broad as it is, does not give the supreme court authority to draft rules that
would repeal portions of the constitution inconsistent with the court's rules.
134. See Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 18, 263 N.E.2d 574 (1970); Mikula v.
Balogh, 9 Ohio App. 2d 250, 224 N.E.2d 148 (1965).
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the matter if it disagrees with the trial judge's ruling. 135 Under Rule
803(24), a ruling on a hearsay question is a matter of discretion.1 36 As
such it is reviewable, if at all, only if it can be demonstrated that the
trial judge plainly and manifestly abused his discretion to such a degree
as to affect a substantial right of the appellant. 137 Under that standard
of review the court of appeals cannot reverse, even if it disagrees with
the trial court's decision, without finding a clear abuse of discretion.138
By vesting broad discretionary authority in the trial judge to create ad
hoc hearsay exceptions, the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence essen-
tially remove any meaningful opportunity for review. 139 The Attorney
General's Office submits that this is too major and fundamental a
135. The standard of review on hearsay rulings in Ohio has consistently been a two-
step analysis: (a) did the trial court err in its application of the law, and (b) was it possibly
prejudicial to the objecting party. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Dolly Madison
Leasing & Furniture Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 122, 131, 326 N.E.2d 651, 658 (1975);
Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 353-59, 91 N.E.2d 690, 693-95
(1950). See Cowan v. Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); James Wilson & Co. v. Barklow, 11
Ohio St. 470 (1860); State v. Young, 7 Ohio App. 2d 194,220 N.E.2d 146 (1966); Lindsay
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 98 Ohio App. 63, 128 N.E.2d 242 (1954); Ludy v. Ludy, 84
Ohio App. 195, 82 N.E.2d 775 (1948); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Frazier, 13 Ohio App. 245
(1920); North Amherst Home Tel. Co. v. Jackson, 4 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 386 (1903).
Nowhere in Ohio law is it recognized that a trial judge has discretion to fashion his
exceptions to the law of hearsay to fit his own sense of what justice requires in the case
before him. The common law hearsay rule and the exceptions to it are not matters which
the trial judge is free to apply or not as he sees fit.
136. For a description of the latitude that Federal Rule 803(24) gives to the trial judge,
see Wood, supra note 133. See also Blackmore, supra note 111, at 616.
137. The difficulty in obtaining appellate review on evidentiary rulings, once they are
conceded to be within the trial judge's discretion, was demonstrated recently in United
States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977), where the court, when asked to review
an evidentiary ruling, stated: "Mhe preferable rule is to uphold the trial judge's exercise
of discretion unless he acts arbitrarily or irrationally." Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
138. Where. . . discretion exists, neither party may successfully urge before an
appellate tribunal that he is entitled to an opposite or different decision, or to a
"correct" decision. . . . Even if the appellate tribunal concedes that by its
lights the wrong decision has been made . . . it will not reverse. A trial court
determination that is discretionary. . . has a status or authority that makes it
either unchallengeable, or challengeable to only a restricted degree.
Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 641 (fo6tnote omitted). See Napolitano v. Compania Sud
Americana deVapores, 421 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1970), where the court refused to find
abuse of discretion although they would have had no hesitancy in reaching an opposite
decision from that of the trial judge. Accord, Construction Ltd. v.Brooks-Skinner
Bldg. Co., 488 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1973).
139. The broad discretion under the proposed Rules parallels that of the Federal
Rules. Accordingly, the comments of Professor Richard H. Field, who has been an
active and prolific advocate of the Federal Rules of Evidence, are pertinent: "Appellate
judges are reluctant to find an abuse of discretion from a cold record. Hence the exercise
of discretion is often as a practical matter unreviewable. The thrust of the Federal Rules
is to enlarge that area of discretion. Field, A Code of EvidenceforArkansas?, 29
ARK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975).
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change in Ohio's law of appeal, especially since it appears that neither
the supreme court nor its Evidence Rules Advisory Committee gave
full consideration to this collateral effect of introducing discretion into
the law of hearsay. 140
The discretion exemplified by Rule 903(24) 14 1 permeates the entire
set of proposed rules, especially Rules 403142 and 102 as interpreted in
United States v. Batts. 14 3 More is lost, however, through broad grants
of discretion than merely the right of appellate review. When the basis
for evidentiary decisions is openly acknowledged to be whatever the
trial judge thinks is right and just, litigants lose the benefit of what self-
restraint and circumspection judges normally exercise when they know
that at some point their decisions on critical evidentiary matters might
be tested against precedent.144 Indeed, reliance upon precedent is the
140. Professor Josiah H. Blackmore, a staff member appointed by the supreme court
to assist the Committee, has noted that the issue of appealability of discretionary
evidentiary matters is in need of further analysis. Blackmore, supra note I 11, at 616.
141. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in its adaptation of the Federal Rules,
refused to adopt Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Professor Field reports that the Maine
Supreme Court rejected the catchall clauses because the court "feared that discretion
would be exercised by trial judges in widely different ways and thus create a degree of
unpredictability which would make preparation for trial unduly difficult. . . . The
Maine Court was unimpressed by [the] purported safeguards and preferred to eliminate
the sections." Field, Maine Rules of Evidence: What They Are and How They Got That
Way, 26 MAINE L. REV. 203, 223 (1975). Professor Field, although a strong supporter of
the Rules, observed that: "There is strong practical justification for the Court's de-
cision .. "Id. The reaction of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court appears to have
been more emphatic than reported by Professor Field. See text accompanying notes
123-24 supra.
142. Rule 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time. It is perhaps the broadest express grant of discretion in the proposed
rules. If Rule 803(24) eliminates hearsay as a rule of law, Rule 403 effects the same
change for the entire body of evidence law. See Rothstein, supra note 94, at 29.
143. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying note 101 supra.
144. Former Solicitor General of the United States, Simon E. Sobeloff, made the
same observation in urging the need for appellate review of criminal sentencing. He
argued that appellate review is needed not only because it provides a means for the
judicial process to rectify internally its own mistakes, but also because review would
have "a sobering and moderating effect [on the trial judge]. . . . The possibility of
review would make itself felt even in cases not actually appealed. The existence of the
power [of appellate review] would make its exercise unnecessary in all but a few cases."
Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court--Should There be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J.
13, 17 (1955).
Benjamin Cardozo also noted the profound effect that the mere availability of review
indirectly exerts. Writing about judicial review of legislation, he stated:
The utility of an external power restraining the legislative judgment is not to be
measured by counting the occasions of its exercise. The great ideals of liberty
and equality are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency
of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, [and] the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles. . . . By con-
scious or subconscious influence, the presence of this restraining power, aloof
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very source of a lawyer's legitimate control over trial court deci-
sions. 145 If the trial judge is obligated to follow a rule of law, counsel
can control or influence the decision by persuading the trial judge that
a particular proposition is the applicable rule of law. Substitute the
judge's personal quest for "justice" in place of his obligation to
discern and follow controlling precedent, as the proposed Ohio Rules
of Evidence do, and this source of influence and control is lost.
The profound effects of expanded discretion cannot be minimized.
Expansion of discretion necessarily implies that the rule of law does
not control and thus constitutes an assault upon the very legitimacy of
the judicial process. The rule of law is not a mystical thing. 146 It
essentially assures that whenever a particular set of circumstances or
conditions exists, a particular result will obtain. It is founded upon the
unspoken premise of the common law tradition-consistency. In the
words of Lord Mansfield, "[w]e must act alike in all cases of like
nature." 1 47 The legitimacy of the judicial process in large part is
founded upon its commitment to decide similar cases similarly, 148 and
the rule of law is merely the method of pursuing that goal. 149 Our
common law judicial process is committed both to that consistency
among decisions and to the improvement of precedent through the
process of repeated reasoned application and distinction. Discretion,
however, is the very antithesis of the rule of law because it eliminates
virtually all barriers to a judge deciding similar cases differently. 150
in the background, but none the less always in reserve tends to stabilize and
rationalize the ... judgment.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-93 (1921).
145. For whereas the court might make records and keep them, but yet pay small
attention to them, or might pay desultory attention, or might even deliberately
neglect an inconvenient record if they should later change their minds about
that type of case, the lawyer searches the records for convenient cases to
support his point, presses upon the court what it has already done before,
capitalizes the human drive toward repetition.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 65 (1930).
146. See id. at 65.
147. Quoted in Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294.
148. "It is the essence of all law that when the facts are the same the result is the
same." Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 77, 58 A. 969, 970 (1904).
149. It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants
and the opposite way between another.
Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if
litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded administration of justice in the
courts.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 144, at 33-34.
150. To say that a court has discretion in a given area of law is to say that it is not
bound to decide the question one way rather than another. In this sense, the
term suggests that there is no wrong answer to the questions posed-at least,
there is no officially wrong answer.
Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 636-37 (emphasis original).
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Indeed, discretion encourages inconsistency because it absolves the
trial judge of any responsibility to articulate or even formulate in his
own mind the precise reasons for his decision. Discretion instructs the
judge to announce the result he wants or thinks just, not the result that
the rule of law, through its centuries of evolution and development,
teaches is the appropriate result for those conditions and circum-
stances.
Other consequences of discretionary rules of evidence are equally
troublesome. Professor Wigmore strongly condemned the concept of
discretionary rules of evidence, and the opposition of the Attorney
General's Office to the proposed Rules parallels Professor Wigmore's
criticism. Professor Wigmore warned that when vast discretion is
handed to the trial judge on evidentiary matters, predictability of
decisions is necessarily lost, and uncertainty in litigation is in-
creased. 151 Because discretion allows the trial judge to base his eviden-
tiary rulings on personal notions of justice, counsel can no longer rely
upon the fact that a certain form of evidence consistently has been
admitted or consistently excluded. The trial judge is free to depart from
the traditional resolution of an issue with full assurance that, absent a
clear abuse of discretion affecting a substantial right of a party, no
higher court is going to substitute its judgment even if the higher court
disagrees with the ruling.
The fundamental error in the reasoning which seeks to expand
discretion under the evidentiary rules is that it rests on too narrow a
view of the function that the law of evidence performs in the legal
process. If the rules of evidence had significance only in the court-
room, flexibility should prevail over certainty to insure that all reliable
evidence is put before the jury. Indeed, the Federal Rules were drafted
on that very premise. The law of evidence, however, has a far broader
role in the legal process than just courtroom application. Well over
eighty-five percent of all cases are settled out of court. 152 Untold
151. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28
A.B.A.J. 23, 24 (1942). Speaking about the development of judicial precedent when the
standard of appellate review is manifest abuse of discretion, Professor Wigmore wrote:
But. . . what has the appellate court got to go upon? Not the misapplication of
a rule, for no rule has been declared. It has only the offer, the record, and the
ruling. Thus the uncertainty of practice is merely relegated to the appellate
court; and the Bar is no better off next time than before, in preparing for
trials. . . . [I]s it not probable that in these proposed large areas of "discre-
tion" the Law of Evidence will suffer, not a re-form, but a relapse into that
primal condition of chaos, described in Genesis 1:2, when the Earth "was
without form and void"?
Id.
152. Cf. Fuchsberg, Realistic Settlement Techniques, 1 TRIAL L.Q. 367 (1964) (over
95% of personal injury cases are settled out of court); Groce, Personal Injury Cases:
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numbers of cases are never filed as legal actions at all. One reason
cases are settled out of court or are never filed at all is that lawyers
have some ability to assess the strength and value of their cases. They
are able, to some extent, to determine on what issues they are likely to
prevail because they are able to ascertain to some degree-what the
evidence on those issues will be.153 Rules of evidence thus play a
major role in resolving disputes outside the four walls of the courtroom
and in filtering cases out of the judicial process. Predictability is
central to this role. When the admissibility of evidence turns on the
personal sense of justice of the trial judge, fewer cases can be settled
without litigation, and this larger function of evidence law is necessari-
ly lost. 154
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence made a considered
decision when they included broad discretionary rules. They believed
that discretion had to be incorporated into the Federal Rules in order to
allow for continued development in- the law of evidence. They feared
that nondiscretionary evidence rules would preclude further growth.155
This article demonstrates, however, that broad discretionary rules of
evidence supplant the rule of law. When discretion is the recognized
standard a judge is to apply on evidentiary issues, several changes
occur. First, the right of appeal on evidentiary matters is all but lost. 156
Lost also are the restraints that a judge feels when he knows that he is
to follow a rule of law rather than intuitive notions of "right" or
"justice." Predictability too is lost when judges are free to decide
Reaching Reasonable Settlements Before Trial and Minimizing Recovery at Trial, 20
ARK. L. REv. 18 (1966) (98% of claims arising out of automobile accidents are settled).
Although these articles present statistics from other jurisdictions, there is no reason to
believe that Ohio's statistics would be significantly different.
153. Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-Attempt at Uniformity in Federal
Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1061, 1071 (1969).
154. This, of course, says nothing about the increased burdens upon the courts when
evidence matrers are decided on a case-by-case basis rather than by adherence to
precedent. Cardozo noted that:
[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every
past decision could be reopened in eveiy case, and one could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him .... The situation would ... be intolerable if. . . changes
in the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 144, at 149-50.
155. See Berger, An Introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 LITIGATION 8
(1975). See generally, Spangenburg, note 153 supra; Weinstein, note 114 supra.
156. Judge Weinstein believes that, under the proposed Rules, the role of the appel-
late courts is to examine evidentiary rulings of trial judges only in "cases of dgregious
error." In fact, according to Judge Weinstein: "Lawyers can expect the terms 'discre-
tion' and 'harmless error' to blunt all but the most powerful attacks on the most serious
evidence errors." Weinstein, supra note 114, at 528.
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
evidence questions based on their own sense of justice rather than
according to precedent or accepted principles of law.
Expressly injecting discretion into rules of evidence in order to
preserve flexibility and potential for growth changes also a fundamen-
tal feature of our judicial process. Under the common law, unless a
matter is recognized to be within the trial judge's discretion, such as
the order of evidence or form of questions, the trial judge is
constrained to apply the law as he finds it.157 On legal matters, his
ruling is either right or wrong. Flexibility, of course, is essential to the
growth of the law, but the common law does not recognize it at the trial
court level. The power and right to fashion developments in the law are
reserved to reviewing courts, courts that are removed from the heat,
emotion, and public pressures of trial practice, courts whose formal
pronouncements on the current state of the law are effective across the
jurisdiction. Change in the law under this system occurs when a trial
judge either misreads existing law but is affirmed on appeal, or when
the trial judge anticipates change and knowingly rules contrary to
existing law. 158
The proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence would change all of this.
They would, under the rubric of discretion, take the power to change
the law that now rests in the Supreme Court of Ohio and, perhaps, in
the ten courts of appeals, and would place in the hands of over five
hundred state trial court judges the right and power to fashion case-by-
case changes in the law of evidence. 159 The trial judges would become
the legitimate draftsmen of their own evidentiary innovations. Because
the decisions of these judges are discretionary, the case-by-case inno-
vations are all but unreviewable by higher courts. 1 60 Moreover, trial
judges rarely express the basis for their evidentiary rulings and even
less frequently do they author written opinions on these rulings. The
result is that trial judges are free to wander on evidence questions as
widely as each judge's sense of justice may carry him, without either
the restraint of appellate review or the guidance of precedent. It is hard
to understand how consistency or uniformity on evidentiary rulings can
be achieved under these circumstances.
157. That a trial judge is bound to apply the law as he finds it is a long-established
tenet of this jurisdiction. See, e.g., Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank, 9 Ohio
St. 606, 614-15 (1859), where the court said: "The decision of an appellate court is
evidence of law, and in the inferior courts in the nature of conclusive evidence." See
also In re Shott, 16 Ohio App. 2d 72, 241 N.E.2d 773 (1968); Ford v. Papcke, 26 Ohio
App. 225, 158 N.E. 558 (1927).
158. Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank, 9 Ohio St. 606, 615 (1859).
159. Cf. Blackmore, Some Things About Hearsay: Article VII, 6 CAP. U. L. REV.
597, 616 (1977).
160. See notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text.
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It has often been said that trial judges have always exercised
discretion under the common law, and what is given them by the
proposed Rules is, at most, only slightly more discretion than that
which they have always exercised." I In other words, so the argument
goes, judges have always had discretion and the Ohio Rules of Evi-
dence merely recognize that fact. To be sure, trial judges have always
had latitude. But the latitude on questions of law is only that of any
free moral agent-the freedom to choose not to follow the law as he
understands it. On issues that are considered questions of law, the
common law has never recognized this moral freedom to be the trial
judge's legal right or power. 162 If the trial judge chooses not to follow
the law as he understands it and the court of appeals disagrees, the trial
judge is reversed for error. If the court of appeals agrees with him,
change results in the law of the jurisdiction. 163 But it is one thing to say
that trial judges have always had the freedom not to follow the law as
they understand it; it is quite another to say that, because judges have
always been free to disregard the law, there should no longer be any
law for the trial judge to apply or against which a higher court is to
review the trial judge's decision.
The common law allows judges enough flexibility not to retard the
growth of the law, but it preserves the opportunity for full legal
review, thus maintaining a mechanism for organized systemic change
in the law. In short, under the common law, both flexibility and the
rule of law are simultaneously maintained.
Codifying the common law rules of evidence necessarily forces a
choice between flexibility, on the one hand, and rigid rules of evidence
161. See Field, supra note 141, at 224.
162. For a discussion of the theory behind the development and use of precedent, see
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 145, at 65. Llewellyn goes on to enumerate some of the
practical uses of precedent:
To continue past practices is to provide a new official in his inexperience with
the accumulated experience of his predecessors. If he is ignorant, he can learn
from them and profit by the knowledge of those who have gone before him. If
he is idle he can have their action brought to his attention and profit by their
industry. If he is foolish he can profit by their wisdom. If he is biased or corrupt
the existence of past practices to compare his action with gives a public check
upon his biases and his corruption, limits the frame in which he can indulge
them unchallenged. Finally, even though his predecessors may themselves, as
they set up the practice, have been idle, ignorant, foolish and biased, yet the
knowledge that he will continue what they have done gives a basis from which
men may predict the action of the courts; a basis to which they can adjust their
expectations and their affairs in advance. To know the law is helpful, even
when the law is bad. Hence it is readily understandable that in our system there
has grown up first the habit of following precedent, and then the legal norm that
precedent is to be followed .... [E]ach case must be decided as one instance
under a general rule.
Id. at 65-66.
163. Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank, 9 Ohio St. 606, 615 (1859).
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on the other. The Federal Rules and the proposed Ohio Rules opt for
flexibility, which explains the presence of Rules such as 102, 403, and
803(24) that grant broad power to mitigate the effect of other seeming-
ly mandatory or prohibitory rules of evidence. This choice brings with
it the problems with discretion discussed above. 164 The sequence is
unavoidable: to avoid rigid rules of evidence, one must choose some
degree of discretion. To articulate discretion, however, is to alter
drastically the relationship between the trial judge and appellate courts
under the common law. 165 This dilemma is inherent in codification.
Resolution can only be attempted once it is recognized that as desirable
as it may seem to have a single corpus of evidence rules, the result will
either be excessively rigid or will fundamentally alter the judicial
process.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has frequently been stated by those who favor the adoption of the
proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence that whatever may be wrong with
them, at least lawyers and judges will have in one place a definitive
statement of most of the evidence law. 166 Indeed, it is the view of the
Supreme Court of Ohio that the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence will
advance uniformity and predictability of decisions.167 This article has
emphasized that, while adoption of a definitive statement of eviden-
tiary rules may be a worthwhile goal, the proposed Ohio Rules of
Evidence, quite apart from problems with specific rules, provide for so
much judicial discretion that the objective of certainty and uniformity
164. See text accompanying notes 136-54 supra.
165. Attorney General of the United States Hugh S. Legare, discussing the phenome-
non of codification, wrote:
A rule is [published in a reporter); if it be inaccurately enunciated you go to
the case which has settled it. Your remedy is in the report; you detect the error
and rectify it; and the precision and uniformity of the law is maintained. But
from the moment you enact all these rules, they are adopted and promulgated
as positive law, and must be interpreted as such. You are to make a great
bonfire of your libraries and take a new start. If there is the least change or
obscurity in the language, verbal criticism begins, everything that has been
settled is afloat once more, and the glorious uncertainty continues until as many
more camel loads of reports take the place of the old ones.
Quoted in R. FLOYD CLARKE, THE SCIENCE OF LAW AND LAW MAKING 45 (1898), quoted
in Hahlo, Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace, 30 MOD. L. REV. 241, 250 (1967)
(emphasis original).
166. See, e.g., Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida's Proposed Rules of Evidence, 2 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 681, 682 (1976), where the author looks to the rules to "ensure uniformity in
the application of the rules of evidence in the various courts throughout the state."
167. Chief Justice C. William O'Neill has written: "The Court believes that the Ohio
law of evidence will be enhanced with the certainty and uniformity of the rules."
O'Neill, Introduction, Symposium: The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 515,
516 (1977).
[Vol. 28:344
1978] OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 387
is necessarily unachievable. Those goals are incompatible with eviden-
tiary rules that permit the trial judge to do whatever his sense of justice
dictates and assure him that no appellate judge will look over his
shoulder. In short, certainty and uniformity cannot be achieved
where a decision depends not on the law, but on a particular individu-
al's sense of justice; for when you change the man, you change the
law.
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Appendix A
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(Ordered Printed by the House)
112th GENERAL ASSEMBLY
REGULAR SESSION,
1977-1978
Am. H. Con. R. No. 14
MESSRS. LEONARD-LEHMAN-BATCHELDER-MRS. POPE-
MESSRS. BETTS-FINAN-TRANTER
CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION
To disapprove the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence.
Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio,
WHEREAS, The Ohio Supreme Court, under the authority granted
by Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution did, on January
12, 1977, promulgate proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence to govern
proceedings in the courts of this state; and
WHEREAS, Such proposed rules of evidence create new areas of
broad, virtually unreviewable discretion and otherwise effectuate
numerous changes in the law of evidence currently recognized in this
state which has for years well-served the interests of impartial justice
and has evolved from the experience of several centuries; and
WHEREAS, The proposed rules would, in some cases, substantially
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights contrary to the specific
prohibition of Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution; and
WHEREAS, The 112th General Assembly constituted the Judici-
[Page 2]
ary Committees of the House and Senate to make a careful and
thorough study of each proposed rule and to submit their recommenda-
tions accordingly; and
* Bracketed page numbers refer to pagination of original docu-
ment-Ed.
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WHEREAS, The Judiciary Committees, through the means of select
subcommittees which have met jointly and held hearings on the pro-
posed rules, have made a preliminary review of such rules but have not
had sufficient time to complete a comprehensive study of the potential
impact of the proposed rules upon current practices and procedures in
the courts of Ohio and upon the substantive rights of the citizens of this
state; and
WHEREAS, The comprehensive nature of the proposed rules neces-
sitates that the General Assembly must, in the interest of justice,
devote itself to a careful, deliberative, and thorough study of such rules
before allowing them to take effect, which study the General Assembly
cannot possibly complete in a responsible manner prior to the July 1,
1977 constitutional deadline, much less prior to the May 1, 1977
deadline for the submission of amendments to the proposed rules; and
WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States has already con-
sidered the subject of codification of the law of evidence and deter-
mined that such codification is the proper function of the legislative
rather than the judicial branch of government, as evidenced by its act
of March 30, 1973 (Public Law 93-12, 87 Stat. 1) which deferred the
effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court until such time as they were enacted into
law by statute; therefore be it
Resolved, That this 112th General Assembly of the State of Ohio,
does hereby disapprove of the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence and
any amendments submitted thereto in their entirety; and be it further
[Page 3]
Resolved, That it is the intention of the General Assembly in
adopting this Concurrent Resolution of Dispproval [sic] to comply
with Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, and thus to
prevent the proposed Rules from taking effect.
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(Amended Senate Joint Resolution No. 25)
JOINT RESOLUTION
To establish a joint select committee to study proposals
for the adoption of rules of evidence to govern
proceedings in the courts of this state.
Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the State of
Ohio,
WHEREAS, By the adoption of Amended House Concurrent Resolu-
tion No. 14, adopted by the House of Representatives on June 15,
1977 and concurred in by the Senate on June 27, 1977, this 112th
General Assembly disapproved of the proposed Ohio Rules of Evi-
dence filed by the Ohio Supreme Court on January 12, 1977 with the
Clerk of the Senate and the Legislative Clerk of the House, and thus
prevented the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence from taking effect;
and
WHEREAS, The proposed rules were disapproved because they
created new areas of broad, virtually unreviewable discretion and
made numerous changes in the law of evidence; because they would,
in some cases, substantially abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive
rights contrary to the specific prohibition of Section 5(B) of Article IV
of the Ohio Constitution; and because the General Assembly did not
have sufficient time to complete a careful, deliberate, and thorough
study of the proposed rules before the expiration of the constitutional
time limits after which they would have taken effect; and
WHEREAS, In recent years numerous studies have been made of the
rules of evidence and new rules of evidence have been adopted both by
the federal government and the governments of several of our sister
states; and
WHEREAS, The codification and adoption of rules of evidence to be
used in the courts of this state would provide a convenient and au-
thoritative reference for use in trial practice, thus eliminating exteisive
research among scattered cases and statutes expedit-
* Bracketed page numbers refer to pagination of original docu-
ment-Ed.
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[Page 21
ing the trial of cases, and helping to assure the uniform administration
of justice throughout the state; and
WHEREAS, Numerous other benefits would accrue to the citizens,
business entities, and governmental units of this state by virtue of
having ready access to understandable and comprehensive rules of
evidence that would be relevant to their daily living, business transac-
tions, and performance of governmental functions; now therefore be it
Resolved, That there is hereby created a joint select committee
composed of four members of the Senate appointed by the President
Pro Tempore, not more than two of whom shall be of the same political
party, and four members of the House of Representatives appointed by
the Speaker, not more than two of whom shall be of the same political
party; that the President Pro Tempore shall designate from the ap-
pointed members a permanent chairman of the joint select committee,
and that the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate the
permanent vice-chairman in the same manner; that the members shall
be appointed no later than fifteen days following the adoption of this
resolution; and that within fifteen days of their appointment, the joint
select committee shall meet at the call of the chairman; and be it
further
Resolved, That the joint select committee make a careful, delibera-
tive, and thorough study of the statutory and common law rules of
evidence of this state, the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence submitted
by the Ohio Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
evidentiary rules enacted by Congress that supplement or supplant the
Federal Rules in certain cases, the rules of evidence adopted in other
states, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the experience of the federal
courts and courts of other states in administering justice under such
rules, and such other information as may be available on the subject;
and be it further
Resolved, That the Legislative Service Commission shall provide
staff personnel to serve the joint select committee; and be it further
Resolved, That the joint select committee shall submit a compre-
hensive final report by December 31, 1978 which shall contain the
committee's recommendations with respect to the repeal, amendment,
or enactment of statutes relating to the rules of evidence, the effect of
the various proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence upon the existing law of
this state, the desirability and feasibility of enactment of proposed
rules of evidence, and the
1978]
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approval or disapproval of rules of evidence promulgated by the Ohio
Supreme Court; thereafter the joint select committee shall cease to
exist.
Adopted September 29, 1977.
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REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE
TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
ON THE PROPOSED OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Joint Judiciary Subcommittee, having considered the Proposed
Supreme Court Rules of Evidence, reports back to the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees a recommendation that the proposed
rules not be accepted, based on the following reasons:
1. The necessity for an exhaustive study of the proposed rules.
The informative, objective, and comprehensive testimony of repre-
sentatives of the Supreme Court indicates that competent and experi-
enced counsel have made an extensive study, on behalf of the Supreme
Court, first to determine whether adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is feasible in Ohio, and second to adapt those rules to the
specific needs of the Ohio courts.
The Joint Subcommittee believes an equally exhaustive study
should be made on behalf of the General Assembly to assure the
citizens of Ohio that the rules adopted represent the best judgment of
both the Supreme Court and of the General Assembly. The Constitu-
tion of Ohio contemplates that both branches of government concur in
the adoption of the rules with a full understanding of their scope and
application and of changes resulting in existing Ohio law.
The experience of the Congress of the United States demonstrates
the importance of a deliberative study of the Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence. Indeed, after the initial promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence by the Supreme Court, committees of Congress devoted
considerable time to a review of the Rules before those Rules were
enacted into law.
2. The need to understand each rule and the reasons for adopting it.
The rules were submitted without explanatory notes, and are stated
in broad, general principles. The Joint Subcommittee cannot, solely by
examina-
* Bracketed page numbers refer to pagination of original docu-
ment-Ed.
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tion of the language of the rules, determine the rationale for proposing
the adoption of each rule, the changes each rule would make in
existing law, whether the rule is from a Federal Rule of Evidence or
from Ohio law or other sources, or, most importantly, what the full
scope and manner of application of the proposed rule would be in the
various trial courts of this state.
[Page 2]
Comments upon the proposed rules, both orally before the Joint
Subcommittee and in written communications to the Joint Subcommit-
tee, indicate that lawyers who have studied the rules differ in their
interpretation of certain of the rules.
The Joint Subcommittee therefore believes that it cannot, on behalf
of the General Assembly, determine the meaning and effect of any
proposed rule unless it is informed, by staff notes of representatives of
the Supreme Court, of their reasons for adopting each rule, its anti-
cipated effect upon existing Ohio law, the sources of the rule, the
experience of courts that are now applying the rule in the trial of cases,
and any court decisions interpreting the proposed rule in this or other
jurisdictions.
3. The need to compare the rules with existing Ohio statutes.
The Joint Subcommittee was not, in the time allotted, able to
determine the precise effect of the rules upon existing sections of the
Revised Code. This information is needed by every lawyer and court in
the state. Sections in conflict with the rules should be expressly
repealed rather than repealed by implication. Further, the General
Assembly may prefer the rule of evidence established by the Revised
Code to a rule proposed by the Supreme Court. A preliminary com-
puter survey reveals that "evidence" appears in 1,192 sections of the
Revised Code; "testimony" in 281 sections of the Revised Code;
"testify" in 144 sections of the Revised Code; "proof or prove" in
472 sections of the Revised Code; "relevant" in 115 sections of the
Revised Code; "admission" in 169 sections of the Revised Code;
"witness" in 467 sections of the Revised Code; "privilege" in 383
sections of the Revised Code; and "presumption" in 30 sections of the
Revised Code; a possible total of 3253 sections of the Revised Code
that could be affected or repealed by the Rules. At the present
[Page 3]
time, the Joint Subcommittee cannot determine the difference between
the proposed rules and the existing Ohio statutes. Obviously, not all of
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the sections including the above terms contain rules of evidence.
Nevertheless, the computer search indicates the scope of the task that
must be performed if the General Assembly is to be fully informed of
changes in the laws that it has enacted that would be brought about by
the Rules.
4. The General Assembly's concern for substantive rights.
Lawyers disagree as to whether particular subjects should be clas-
sified under rules of evidence, and, even if classed under the rules of
evidence, whether the subject matter creates substantive rights or
relates solely to procedures for establishing facts in the trial of cases.
The Joint Subcommittee believes that under Article IV, Section 5(B)
of the Ohio Constitution, any rules of evidence adopted as rules of
court should clearly relate solely to practice and procedure, and not to
substance.
The Joint Subcommittee further believes that, in accord with prin-
ciples expressed in Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St. 2d 48 (1972), the
Supreme Court and the General Assembly should consider "sub-
stance" and "procedure" from a modern and logical view of the
appropriate division of constitutional power between the judicial and
legislative branches and recognize that "both our courts and the
General Assembly have departed from the semantic fog of withering
precedent in this area of the law." Gregory, supra p. 54.
Such a logical division would recognize that the judicial process of
adjudicating facts, administered by a specialized profession, is not in
some instances as well suited for establishing and administering social
policies as is the legislative process of determining legislative facts by
a body that not only is representative of all of the people in the state but
also has means
[Page 4]
for obtaining information that could not be brought before a court in
the judicial process. For example, in relation to sexual offenses,
sections 2907.02, 2907.05, and 2907.11 of the Revised Code, al-
though affecting court procedure in criminal cases, provide a clear
example of a legislative solution to a social problem, based upon the
determination of legislative facts which could not have been ad-
judicated in a court. The courts could have no way of officially
knowing, or determining, that the law enforcement processes were
abusing and demeaning sexual crime victims, violating their rights of
personal privacy, and encouraging rapists by discouraging rape victims
from reporting offenses.
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5. The limited time within which the Federal Rules have been in
effect.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress effective
January 2, 1975, and, by their express terms, took effect 180 days later
on July 1, 1975. Thus, experience under the rules has been compara-
tively brief. It is too soon to tell how well they are working, or what
amendments may still be necessary.
Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain all of the
rules of evidence that are applicable in the federal judicial system.
Federal Rule 402 states that "all relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided . . . , by Act of Congress, . . . "The
Joint Subcommittee does not have before it those Acts of Congress
now in effect that make relevant evidence inadmissible or otherwise
affect evidentiary matters in the federal courts.
In addition, much of the practice of the federal courts is not
comparable to the practice of Ohio courts. Federal courts do not handle
domestic relations cases, paternity cases, violations of traffic laws,
forcible entry and detainer cases, and many other types of cases
decided in the state courts. The federal courts are not concerned with
regulatory and licensing procedures similar to those Ohio procedures
that deny access to the courts to certain unlicensed persons or prohibit
proof of ownership of an automobile except by a certificate of title.
[Page 5]
Thus, the Joint Subcommittee is not in a position to compare all of
the Ohio evidentiary law with all of the federal evidentiary law; does
not have a substantial basis of federal experience to draw upon in
determining the impact of a change to federal law; and can only
conjecture as to the effect of adoption of rules patterned after the
Federal Rules of Evidence in deciding cases of a type that never come
before the federal courts.
6. The need to determine whether the bar is prepared to operate
under the rules, beginning on July 1, 1977.
Some legislators and lawyers have opposed the immediate adop-
tion of the rules, and have asked for further time to study the rules and
submit proposed amendments. No organized group of judges or law-
yers has expressed strong support for the immediate adoption of the
rules, although the Joint Subcommittee recognizes that the absence of
comment may not reflect opposition to their adoption.
At this time, the Joint Subcommittee has no means of knowing
whether the bar and the courts of Ohio would be prepared to operate
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under the proposed rules-particularly in view of the fact that there has
been no proposal for the express repeal of existing statutes, nor any
indication of what statutes would be considered to be repealed as in
conflict with the rules. The testimony before the Joint Subcommittee,
and the study of the rules by the members of the Joint Subcommittee,
affords no basis for belief that the bar and the courts would be prepared
to operate under them. The Joint Subcommittee fears that the majority
of the bar would be taken by surprise, and would have a far more
difficult time adjusting to the new rules of evidence than was the case
in previous adoptions of rules of pleading and procedure.
7. Need to study the experience of other states.
A number of other states have recently enacted rules of evidence
patterned
[Page 6]
after, but not identical to, the Federal Rules of Evidence. All of these
states have changed the rules in various particulars-as part of the
legislative process. Further, those states can amend their rules by
enacting statutes. A study of the experience of those states, and
changes made in the Federal Rules during the legislative process,
would be extremely helpful to the Ohio General Assembly which,
contrary to the law in other states, will have no power to amend or
initiate proposals to amend the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence after
they are adopted.
8. Need to understand the new philosophy of law embodied in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are new, both in language and
philosophy. They embody changes that have been advocated for years
by leading trial lawyers, judges, and educators. They are not a mere
restatement or codification of existing law. Desirable though these
changes may be, they will nevertheless require a reeducation of law-
yers who have been trained and educated in the use of the present Ohio
statutory and common law rules of evidence.
The advocates of the philosophy embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence have expressed strong opposition to any legislative role in
the promulgation of rules of evidence. They believe that courts should
be given inherent constitutional power to prescribe procedural and
evidentiary rules. Congress did not subscribe to this philosophy, but
rather adopted the rules by legislation-although that legislation was
inspired by and closely followed the recommendations of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
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It therefore appears to the Joint Subcommittee that the General
Assembly and the Supreme Court should, with utmost harmony and
respect for their coequal status, ascertain and agree upon their respec-
tive roles in the promulgation and approval of rules of evidence, as
opposed to the exercise of purely judicial or legislative power. It is
clear that the Ohio Constitution does not
[Page 7]
contemplate that the General Assembly shall have power comparable
to that of Congress over the rules of practice and procedure. However,
the Ohio constitutional provisions have been borrowed directly from
an Act of Congress; and it is not possible at this time to state clearly
what, in law, constitutes a matter of practice and procedure and what,
in contrast, constitutes a matter of a substantive right.
The Joint Subcommittee believes that any proposed rules should
clearly reflect the limits of judicial and legislative powers.
Date: April 20, 1977
/5/ Senator Anthony J. /S/ Representative Paul
Celebrezze, Jr. Leonard
IS/ Senator Michael Schwarzwalder /S/ Representative Terry Tranter
/S/ Senator Stanley J. Aronoff /S/ Representative William Batchelder
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